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 The acquisition of property plays an important 
role in the federal Income Tax Act (ITA), determining 
eligibility for a number of tax benefits, including 
entitlement to capital cost allowance, investment tax 
credits, and the deductibility of interest expenses 
incurred in respect of eligible property. In spite of its 
importance, the concept of an acquisition of property is 
not defined in the ITA, and it has been subject to 
divergent interpretations in the common law and the 
civil law. 
 The author traces the sources of law informing the 
meaning of an acquisition of property in the common 
law and the civil law, and concludes that certain 
transactions may be subject to different tax 
consequences depending on whether they occurred in a 
common law province or in Quebec. The author 
demonstrates that the primary reference for determining 
whether a taxpayer acquired property—the twofold test 
in M.N.R. v. Wardean Drilling Ltd.—is premised on 
common law concepts and is incompatible with the 
goals of Canadian bijuralism expressed in the Federal 
Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1 and section 
8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act. In response to this 
contradiction, the author proposes a number of statutory 
amendments to ensure the uniform and predictable 
application of the ITA across Canada.
Dans la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu (LIR), 
l’acquisition de bien permet de déterminer l’éligibilité à 
un nombre d’avantages fiscaux, notamment au droit à la 
déduction pour amortissement, au crédit d’impôt à 
l’investissement et à la déductibilité des frais d’intérêts 
encourus relativement au bien éligible. Malgré son 
importance, le concept d’acquisition de bien n’est pas 
défini dans la LIR et a reçu des interprétations 
divergentes en common law et en droit civil. 
 L’auteur retrace les sources de droit éclairant le 
sens d’acquisition de bien en common law et en droit 
civil. Il conclut que la réalisation de certaines 
transactions dans une province de common law ou au 
Québec peut entraîner des conséquences fiscales 
différentes. L’auteur démontre que la référence 
principale en matière de détermination d’acquisition de 
bien par un contribuable (le test en deux parties de 
l’affaire M.N.R. v. Wardean Drilling Ltd.) est basée sur 
des concepts de common law et est incompatible avec 
les objectifs du bijuridisme canadien tel qu’exprimé 
dans la Loi d'harmonisation n° 1 du droit fédéral avec 
le droit civil et dans l’article 8.1 de la Loi
d’interprétation fédérale. Afin de répondre à cette 
contradiction, l’auteur propose un nombre 
d’amendements législatifs pour assurer une application 
uniforme et prévisible de la LIR partout au Canada. 
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Introduction
 The concept of an acquisition of property plays an important role in the federal 
Income Tax Act,1 determining eligibility for a number of benefits. The ability to 
deduct capital cost allowance, for example, depends on the prior acquisition of 
depreciable property,2 the definition of which requires that the property was “acquired 
by the taxpayer.”3 Similarly, investment tax credits are available only where the 
taxpayer has “acquired” the property in that fiscal year,4 while the deduction for 
interest expenses under subparagraph 20(1)(c)(ii) of the ITA applies to interest on an 
amount payable for property acquired by the taxpayer.5 Despite its importance, the 
concept of an acquisition of property is not defined in the ITA, leaving its meaning to 
judicial interpretation. 
 For almost thirty years now, the meaning of this expression for Canadian income 
tax purposes has generally been governed by the judicial test set out in M.N.R. v. 
Wardean Drilling Ltd., in which Justice Cattanach stated that “the proper test as to 
when property is acquired must relate to the title to the property in question or to the 
normal incidents of title, either actual or constructive, such as possession, use and 
risk.”6 Regularly cited in subsequent tax cases involving the acquisition of property,7 
this twofold test stipulates that property is acquired by a taxpayer within the meaning 
of the ITA not only when the taxpayer obtains legal title to the property, but also when 
 
1 R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1 [ITA]. 
2 Ibid., s. 13(21), s.v. “undepreciated capital cost”. 
3 Ibid., s. 13(21), s.v. “depreciable property”. 
4 Ibid., ss. 127(5)(a), 127(6)(a). See also ibid., s. 127(9), s.v. “investment tax credit”, “certified 
property”, “qualified property” (all of which require the taxpayer to have acquired the property at 
specific times). 
5 Ibid. (permitting a deduction for interest on “an amount payable for property acquired for the 
purpose of gaining or producing income from the property or for the purpose of gaining or producing 
income from a business”). 
6 [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 166 at 172, [1969] C.T.C. 265 [Wardean Drilling]. 
7 See e.g. Canada v. Henuset Brothers Ltd. (No. 2), [1977] C.T.C. 228, 31 D.T.C. 5169 (F.C.T.D.) 
[Henuset Brothers cited to C.T.C.]; Schultz v. M.N.R., [1979] C.T.C. 2328, 33 D.T.C. 279 (T.R.B.) 
[Schultz cited to C.T.C.]; Kirsch Construction Ltd. v. M.N.R. (1988), 23 F.T.R. 67, 42 D.T.C. 6503 
[Kirsch cited to F.T.R.]; Browning Harvey Ltd. v. M.N.R. (1990), 31 F.T.R. 229, 44 D.T.C. 6105 
[Browning Harvey cited to F.T.R.]; Borstad Welding Supplies (1972) Ltd. v. M.N.R. (1993), 67 F.T.R. 
118, 47 D.T.C. 5457 [Borstad cited to F.T.R.]; Gartry (W.C.) v. Canada, [1994] 2 C.T.C. 2021, 48 
D.T.C. 1947 (T.C.C.) [Gartry cited to C.T.C.]; Canada v. Construction Bérou (1999), [2000] 2 C.T.C. 
174, 53 D.T.C. 5868 (F.C.A.) [Bérou cited to C.T.C.]; Mimetix Pharmaceuticals v. Canada, [2002] 1 
C.T.C. 2188, 55 D.T.C. 1026 (T.C.C.) [Mimetix cited to C.T.C.], aff’d 2003 FCA 106, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 
72, 57 D.T.C. 5194; Terexcavation Antoine Grant v. Canada (2002), 59 D.T.C. 709 (T.C.C.) 
[Terexcavation]. 
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the taxpayer obtains constructive or beneficial ownership of the property (i.e., 
through the “normal incidents of title” such as “possession, use and risk”).8 
 Although the concept of beneficial ownership is well established in common law 
systems, where the law of equity and trusts has long recognized a distinction between 
legal and beneficial ownership,9 it does not exist in civilian systems, which regard 
ownership as absolute and indivisible.10 For this reason, a number of tax cases in the 
Province of Quebec have established that lessee-purchasers under lease-option 
agreements do not acquire property within the meaning of the ITA if legal ownership 
is retained by the lessor-vendor, notwithstanding the fact that the lessee-purchaser has 
obtained possession and use of the property and has assumed the risks normally 
associated with ownership.11 In Bérou, however, a majority of the Federal Court of 
Appeal rejected this line of reasoning, concluding that the test in Wardean Drilling 
governs the acquisition of property in Quebec as well as the rest of Canada.12 In so 
doing, the decision effectively distinguished or “dissociated” the tax meaning of an 
acquisition of property from the civil law of Quebec.13 
 Because the judgment in Bérou was released on 15 November 1999, the court did 
not consider section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act,14 which came into force on 1 
June 2001. According to this provision: 
Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and 
recognized sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada and, unless 
otherwise provided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to 
refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law of 
 
8 See e.g. Kinguk Trawl v. Canada, [2002] 2 C.T.C. 2229 at para. 123, 56 D.T.C. 1399 (T.C.C.) 
(relying on Wardean Drilling for the proposition that “[t]he concept of beneficial ownership, which 
might differ from strict legal ownership, is well recognized in the case law”). 
9 Catherine Brown, “Symposium: Beneficial Ownership and the Income Tax Act” (2003) 51 Can. 
Tax J. 401 at 405-423. 
10 Further discussion of civilian systems will be found in Part II.B, below. 
11 Fortin & Moreau v. M.N.R. (1989), [1990] 1 C.T.C. 2583, 44 D.T.C. 1436 (T.C.C.) [Fortin & 
Moreau cited to C.T.C.]; Canada v. Construction Bérou (1996), 116 F.T.R. 267, 52 D.T.C. 6401 
[Bérou (F.C.T.D.) cited to D.T.C.], rev’d Bérou, supra note 7; Dumais (D.) et fils c. M.N.R. (1990), 
[1991] 1 C.T.C. 2650, 46 D.T.C. 1107 (T.C.C.) [Dumais cited to C.T.C.]; Location Gaétan Lévesque v. 
M.N.R., [1991] 2 C.T.C. 2795, 91 D.T.C. 1374 (T.C.C.) [Gaétan Lévesque cited to C.T.C.]; and 
Laurent Goulet & Fils v. M.N.R. (1991), [1992] 1 C.T.C. 2419, 46 D.T.C. 1605 (T.C.C.). 
12 Supra note 7. 
13 David G. Duff, “The Federal Income Tax Act and Private Law in Canada: Complementarity, 
Dissociation, and Canadian Bijuralism” (2003) 51 Can. Tax J. 1 at 40-41. On the concept of 
dissociation between federal law and provincial private law, see Louise Maguire Wellington, 
“Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and Terminology” in The Harmonization of 
Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice Canada, 2001) [Harmonization] fasc. 4, 1 at 5. 
14 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21. 
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property and civil rights, reference must be made to the rules, principles or 
concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being applied.15 
Thus, the test in Wardean Drilling may no longer apply within the Province of 
Quebec if the two conditions in section 8.1—the necessity of referring to provincial 
sources of law and the absence of a prohibition on doing so—are met in interpreting 
the meaning of an acquisition of property in the ITA. If so, it would be advantageous 
to amend the ITA to ensure that the meaning of an acquisition of property for tax 
purposes has uniform application throughout Canada. 
 This paper examines the concept of an acquisition of property for the purposes of 
the ITA, considering tax cases in which the concept has been addressed; private law 
rules, principles, and concepts that may be relevant to its interpretation; the impact of 
section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act on this interpretation; and the merits of a 
statutory amendment to ensure that the meaning of this expression is given uniform 
application throughout Canada. The first part of the paper reviews tax cases in which 
the concept of an acquisition of property has been interpreted and applied, beginning 
with the judgment in Wardean Drilling and then considering tax cases in common 
law provinces and the Province of Quebec. The second part of the paper examines the 
common law and civil law rules, principles, and concepts to which courts have 
implicitly or explicitly referred in order to interpret the meaning of an acquisition of 
property for tax purposes, with particular attention to conditional sales agreements 
and leasing transactions, the most common types of tax cases concerning the 
acquisition of property. The third part of the paper considers the impact of the 
Interpretation Act on the meaning of an acquisition of property in the ITA, arguing 
that the two conditions in section 8.1 for referring to provincial sources of law are 
met. Since this analysis suggests that the meaning of an acquisition of property may 
be subject to different interpretations in common law provinces and the Province of 
Quebec, the fourth part of the paper proposes that the ITA should be amended to 
include a statutory definition of this term to ensure that the concept is given a uniform 
interpretation throughout Canada. The fifth part of the paper summarizes the 
argument and offers concluding observations. 
I. The Acquisition of Property in Canadian Income Tax Law 
 In order to appreciate the possible effect of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act 
on the meaning of an acquisition of property for tax purposes, it is essential to begin 
by examining the way in which Canadian courts have interpreted this concept thus 
far. The following sections review the interpretation of this concept in Wardean 
Drilling and subsequent tax cases in common law provinces and in Quebec. 
 
15 Ibid., s. 8.1. 
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A. Wardean Drilling 
 The issue in Wardean Drilling concerned the date at which property was acquired 
by the taxpayer for the purpose of deducting capital cost allowance. The taxpayer had 
carried on a business of drilling oil wells in Alberta and Saskatchewan and had 
purchased a drilling rig and a substructure for the rig, in respect of which it deducted 
capital cost allowance in computing its business income for its 1963 taxation year. 
Although the taxpayer entered into an agreement to purchase the rig on 26 December 
1963, the property required extensive modification for the taxpayer’s purposes and 
delivery did not occur until 18 February 1964. According to the agreement, payment 
was to be made in thirty-six equal monthly instalments commencing on 1 June 1964, 
title was to pass upon shipment, and payment was to be secured by a chattel mortgage 
on the rig. While the taxpayer entered into the agreement to purchase the substructure 
on 23 December 1963, this item did not exist at the time and was neither constructed, 
delivered, nor paid for until “well into 1964.”16 
 The minister disallowed the deductions on the grounds that the property in each 
case was not paid for or delivered until the following taxation year. The Tax Appeal 
Board allowed the taxpayer’s appeal on the basis that the taxpayer had incurred 
expenditures in 1963 by entering into binding agreements to purchase the property.17 
The Exchequer Court reversed the decision and upheld the assessment on the grounds 
that the taxpayer had not acquired the rig and the substructure during its 1963 
taxation year. 
 At the Exchequer Court, the taxpayer relied on the Tax Appeal Board decision, 
arguing that goods are acquired by a purchaser for tax purposes “when the vendor and 
the purchaser have entered into a binding and enforceable contract of sale and 
purchase.”18 Rejecting this interpretation, Justice Cattanach held that “the proper test” 
to determine when property is acquired “must relate to the title to the property in 
question or to the normal incidents of title, either actual or constructive, such as 
possession, use and risk.”19 Thus, he explained, a purchaser has acquired assets for 
the purpose of computing capital cost allowance either (1) “when title has passed, 
assuming that the assets exist at that time,” or (2) “when the purchaser has all the 
incidents of title, such as possession, use and risk, although legal title may remain in 
the vendor as security for the purchase price as is the commercial practice under 
conditional sales agreements.”20 Applying the first branch of this twofold test, Justice 
Cattanach concluded that the taxpayer acquired neither the rig nor the substructure in 
1963 on the grounds that the contract itself stipulated that title to the rig would not 
 
16 Wardean Drilling, supra note 6 at 169-71. 
17 Wardean Drilling Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1967] Tax A.B.C. 171 [Wardean Drilling (T.A.B.)]. 
18 Wardean Drilling, supra note 6 at 172. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. at 173. 
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pass until shipment, which was not until February 1964,21 while title to the 
substructure could not pass until it was actually constructed in 1964.22 
 Although Justice Cattanach did not cite any legal authority for the test that he 
adopted in Wardean Drilling, the distinction between “actual” or “legal” title and 
“constructive” title based on “all the incidents of title” is premised on the common 
law distinction between legal and beneficial ownership. As the Federal Court of 
Appeal observed in Hewlett Packard (Canada) Ltd. v. Canada,23 the language and 
reasoning used by Justice Cattanach corresponds to the common law conception of 
property employed by the Supreme Court of Alberta in Hendrickson v. Mid-City 
Motors Ltd., in which the court held that a conditional sale agreement resulted in a 
sale under the Alberta Sale of Goods Act on the basis that the agreement effectively 
transferred the “property” in the goods to the purchaser in the form of “beneficial 
ownership”, notwithstanding the fact that the vendor retained legal title until the 
purchase price was paid in full.24 Therefore, it is clear that the test in Wardean 
Drilling is firmly rooted in principles and concepts specific to the common law, even 
though it is often viewed as an autonomous interpretation based on the language and 
purposes of the ITA alone.25 As explained in the third part of this paper, it is this 
connection to private law principles and concepts that engages the interpretive rule in 
section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. 
B. Subsequent Tax Cases in Common Law Provinces 
 Although the decision in Wardean Drilling ultimately turned on the first branch 
of Justice Cattanach’s test, subsequent cases in common law provinces have regularly 
looked to the second branch of the test to determine whether property has been 
acquired for the purposes of the ITA.26 In Henuset Brothers, for example, the Federal 
Court concluded that the taxpayer, which entered into a conditional sales agreement 
to purchase several tractors on 30 December 1971, had acquired the tractors on that 
date notwithstanding the fact that legal title to the tractors was retained by the vendor 
 
21 Ibid. at 174, citing the Alberta Sale of Goods Act, R.S.A. 1955, c. 295, ss. 20-21, as am. by R.S.A. 
2000, c. S-2, s. 19(1) (stipulating that property in specific or ascertained goods passes at the moment 
that the parties intend). 
22 Wardean Drilling, supra note 6 at 174-75, citing the Alberta Sale of Goods Act, ibid., s. 21(1) 
(now s. 20(3)): “Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods and the seller is bound to do 
something to the goods for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the property does not 
pass until the thing is done and the buyer has notice thereof.” 
23 2004 FCA 240, 324 N.R. 201, 58 D.T.C. 6498 [Hewlett Packard]. 
24 [1951] 3 D.L.R. 276 at 284, 1 W.W.R. (N.S.) 609 [Hendrickson cited to D.L.R.]. 
25 See e.g. Terexcavation, supra note 7 at para. 35. This case is discussed at infra notes 86-88 and 
accompanying text. 
26 For another case applying the first branch of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling, see Schultz, 
supra note 7 (the taxpayer could not deduct capital cost allowance in respect of a building before it 
was completed since it did not have legal possession of the property). 
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and the tractors themselves remained at the vendor’s premises.27 Noting that the 
taxpayer had the right to use the tractors, could have taken delivery once the sale was 
completed, and that the contracts obliged the taxpayer to insure the tractors against 
risks specified by the vendor, Justice Bastin concluded that “all the incidents of 
ownership other than the legal title reserved in the vendor by the conditional sales 
agreements such as possession, risk and the right to use the tractors were acquired by 
the buyer on December 30, 1971.”28 In support of this conclusion, the court cited the 
twofold test in Wardean Drilling. 
 Likewise, in Gartry, the Tax Court of Canada relied on the second branch of the 
test in Wardean Drilling to conclude that the taxpayer, who had purchased a boat that 
sank in heavy seas before delivery and before title had passed, had acquired 
“sufficient of the incidents of ownership” to allow him to treat the boat as depreciable 
property in respect of which he could deduct a terminal loss under subsection 20(16) 
of the ITA.29 According to Justice Bowman (as he then was), if a taxpayer “has 
exercised sufficient dominion” over property he has promised to purchase such that 
he “orders its modification for his specific purposes, and supervises and pays for 
those modifications,” then he acquires “a sufficient interest in the property and 
indicia of title thereto,” and the property “becomes depreciable property in his hands” 
even if transfer of actual title is deferred until full payment is received.30 Therefore, 
even though legal title and possession remained with the vendor, the court concluded 
that the taxpayer had obtained constructive ownership of the boat under the second 
branch of the test in Wardean Drilling. 
 Furthermore, a number of other decisions in common law provinces have applied 
the second branch of the twofold test from Wardean Drilling to conclude that 
property was not acquired within the meaning of the ITA. In Kirsch, for example, the 
Federal Court considered both branches of the test to decide that the taxpayer, which 
entered into an agreement to purchase a road paver on 30 March 1977,31 had not 
acquired the property before the end of its taxation year, ending 31 March 1977. 
Regarding the first branch of the test, the court held that the taxpayer did not have 
legal title to the road paver before 31 March 1977 because, among other things, the 
contract provided that title would not pass until full payment was made, which did 
not occur until 14 June 1977.32 With respect to the second branch, the court concluded 
that the taxpayer did not have all the incidents of ownership before 31 March 1977 
because it did not obtain possession or use of the property and did not assume any of 
 
27 Supra note 7. 
28 Ibid. at 229. 
29 Supra note 7 at 2029. 
30 Ibid. at 2030 [emphasis added]. 
31 Supra note 7 at para. 11. 
32 Ibid. at para. 8. 
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the risks associated with ownership until after the road paver was delivered on 25 
May 1977.33 
 Similarly, in Browning Harvey, where a taxpayer sold coolers to shopkeepers for 
the exclusive display of its soft drinks under conditional sales agreements, the Federal 
Court held that the shopkeepers had not acquired the coolers when they obtained 
possession because they “did not have all the incidents of title.”34 Despite obtaining 
possession, the court noted that the shopkeepers’ possession was limited by the 
taxpayer’s right to repossess the coolers if they failed to comply with the terms of the 
agreement and that their use of the coolers was limited to storage and display for sale 
of soft drinks manufactured by the taxpayer.35 As well, while the shopkeepers were 
required to insure the coolers against loss, any insurance proceeds were payable to the 
taxpayer, who was obliged to pay for repairs to the coolers after the manufacturer’s 
warranty expired. Finally, the court observed that the shopkeepers “were not entitled 
to destroy the coolers, to dispose of them, or to use them as security for loans.”36 
Justice Martin concluded: 
In my view it is clear from the terms of the agreement that the defendant 
reserved to itself ownership in and title to the coolers for the full seven year 
term of the agreement and by placing the limitations on the use of them which 
the defendant did in the agreement it refused to give to the shopkeepers 
sufficient of the essential incidents of ownership as would cause me to find that 
the parties to the agreement intended by its terms that property in the coolers 
would pass from the defendant to the shopkeepers at the time of the execution 
of the agreement.37 
Because the shopkeepers had not acquired the coolers, the court concluded that the 
taxpayer could not deduct a terminal loss on their alleged disposition. 
 Although Henuset Brothers, Gartry, Kirsch, and Browning Harvey all involved 
conditional sales agreements, tax cases in common law provinces have also applied 
the second branch of the test in Wardean Drilling to determine whether a lessee has 
acquired property for tax purposes under the terms of a lease. In Borstad, for 
example, a taxpayer sold refillable gas cylinders over a five-year period, selling one-
fifth of the cylinders each year and leasing the remainder to the purchaser until they 
were sold.38 The Federal Court applied the second branch of the Wardean Drilling test 
to conclude that the purchaser did not acquire the leased cylinders until they were 
actually sold. Noting that the parties expressly contracted that the taxpayer was to 
retain ownership of the property during the term of the lease, that the purchaser was 
obliged to indemnify the taxpayer if the cylinders were not maintained, that the 
 
33 Ibid. at para. 10. 
34 Supra note 7 at para. 23 [emphasis in original]. 
35 Ibid. at para. 24. 
36 Ibid. at para. 28. 
37 Ibid. at para. 28. 
38 Supra note 7. 
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purchaser was required to retain possession and control of the cylinders, and that the 
taxpayer could terminate the agreement if the purchaser defaulted on any term of the 
contract, Justice Reed concluded that the provisions of the agreement were not 
consistent with the view that the purchaser had “acquired all the incidents of title to 
the cylinders except legal title.”39 On this basis, she rejected the minister’s argument 
that the taxpayer had disposed of the cylinders when the parties entered into a master 
agreement governing their lease and sale. 
 Likewise, in Mimetix, the Tax Court of Canada employed the second branch of 
the Wardean Drilling test to conclude that the taxpayer, which purchased a mixing 
machine after leasing it for eighteen months, did not acquire the property for tax 
purposes until it was actually purchased.40 Observing that the lease agreement did not 
include an option to purchase the mixing machine for a price less than its expected 
fair market value at the purchase date, that the lessor continued to bear risks 
associated with ownership, and that the contract required the lessee to pay the lessor 
cost plus 10 per cent for the repair or replacement of damaged or missing 
components, Justice Lamarre concluded that the taxpayer was ineligible for an 
investment tax credit in respect of the mixer, since the property had already been used 
before the taxpayer acquired it in October 1996.41 
 While the judgments in Borstad and Mimetix held that the lessees in question did
not acquire property under the terms of the respective lease-purchase agreements, 
other cases in common law provinces have held that lessees did acquire property 
pursuant to financing or capital leases. In Kamsel Leasing v. M.N.R., for example, the 
Tax Court of Canada accepted the taxpayer’s argument that the lease agreements that 
it had entered into in the course of its lease financing business “effectively transferred 
substantially all of the benefits and risks of ownership” to the lessees.42 Of particular 
relevance to its conclusion that the transactions were properly characterized as sales 
rather than leases, the court noted that (1) the lessees had “the right at the expiration 
of the lease to acquire the property at a price which at the inception of the lease could 
be said to be substantially less than the probable fair market value of the property at 
the time of permitted acquisition,” and (2) “the option permitted a lessee to acquire 
the property at a price which at the inception of the lease was such that no reasonable 
person would fail to exercise” and “a substantial percentage of the lessees exercised 
the option.”43 Similarly, in M.N.R. v. Moore, the Federal Court concluded that the 
taxpayer and other investors had acquired capital property under a sixty-year lease 
with an option to purchase, for which they had prepaid rent for the entire term. The 
 
39 Ibid. at para. 26. 
40 Supra note 7. 
41 Ibid. at 2212. 
42 [1993] 1 C.T.C. 2279 at 2282, 47 D.T.C. 250 (T.C.C.) [Kamsel Leasing]. 
43 Ibid. at 2283. Sarchuk J. added that “[t]hese two findings ... mirror the circumstances under 
which, according to IT-233R, Revenue Canada would consider a transaction to be a sale rather than a 
lease” (ibid.). This Interpretation Bulletin is discussed at infra notes 80 and 109. 
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court noted that “they acquired substantially all the benefits and risks incidental to 
ownership of property” and there was “reasonable assurance” that they would 
“exercise their option to purchase the land in view of the fact that they were to 
construct a 33-unit apartment building on the site.”44 Although neither of these 
judgments cited the twofold test for an acquisition of property in Wardean Drilling, 
the language and reasoning in each case is similar to the second branch of this test. 
 In marked contrast to all of these judgments, the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Kowdrysh v. Canada concluded that in the context of a temporary investment tax 
credit, the taxpayer in question had acquired farming equipment “when the equipment 
in an ascertained form was purchased by means of a binding and enforceable 
contract.”45 Rejecting the minister’s argument that the taxpayer had not acquired the 
equipment until he obtained legal title or beneficial ownership of the property, the 
court held that the meaning of an acquisition of property must be understood in the 
context of the specific provision which employs this concept. According to Justice 
Létourneau (with Justices Desjardins and Décary concurring): 
In my view, in the context of this temporary investment tax credit, especially in 
the farming industry where substantial investments are made with respect to 
costly, large, sophisticated and specialized equipment which requires a 
considerable amount of time for production, verification, approbation, 
transportation and delivery, the term “acquired” and the time of “acquisition” 
take a different meaning and connotation.46 
For this purpose, therefore, the court gave the concept of an acquisition of property a 
similar meaning to the interpretation adopted by the Tax Appeal Board in Wardean 
Drilling (T.A.B.).47 Since this interpretation was explicitly rejected on appeal to the 
Exchequer Court,48 it is surprising that it should reappear over thirty years later, even 
if only in the context of a special investment tax credit. 
C. Subsequent Tax Cases in Quebec 
 While judicial decisions involving transactions in common law provinces have 
generally applied the second branch of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling to 
determine whether a taxpayer has acquired property for tax purposes, cases involving 
transactions in Quebec have generally ignored or rejected the test for this purpose; 
that is, until the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Bérou.49 In Canada v. Lagueux & 
Frères, for example, a taxpayer leased logging equipment from loan and rental 
companies that had purchased the equipment directly from manufacturers for the sole 
 
44 (1986), 3 F.T.R. 173 at para. 52, 86 D.T.C. 6325. 
45 2001 FCA 34, 267 N.R. 180 at para. 13, 55 D.T.C. 5221 [Kowdrysh]. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Supra note 17. See Part I.A, above. 
48 Wardean Drilling, supra note 6. 
49 Supra note 7. 
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purpose of leasing the property to the taxpayer, under terms that allowed the taxpayer 
to purchase the equipment at a price much lower than its market value when the 
option was exercised. The Federal Court relied on the civil law of Quebec—not the 
twofold test in Wardean Drilling—to determine whether the taxpayer had acquired 
the property within the meaning of the ITA.50 Explaining that “the nature of the rights 
and obligations created by the contracts [at issue] must be arrived at by reference to 
the provisions of the Civil Code,”51 Justice Décary cited the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada, the views of French commentators, and jurisprudence on Quebec law to 
conclude that the contracts were properly characterized as “conditional sales, on a 
suspensive condition, and not leases.”52 On this basis, he held that the taxpayer had 
acquired the logging equipment for tax purposes and could therefore deduct only 
capital cost allowance, not rental payments. 
 Similarly, in Chibougamau Lumber ltée v. M.N.R.,53 a taxpayer entered into 
several agreements to lease equipment with an option to purchase the property for one 
dollar plus any unpaid amounts remaining under the terms of each lease. The 
judgment turned not on the judicial test in Wardean Drilling (which the Tax Review 
Board did not mention), but on the board’s conclusion as a matter of private law that 
the contracts at issue “were not, by any stretch of the imagination, leases in the true 
legal sense of the term,” but rather “represented no more than a purchase on a time 
payment plan.”54 On this basis, as in Lagueux & Frères, the board disallowed the 
difference between the deduction of rental payments claimed by the taxpayer and 
capital cost allowance to which it was properly entitled. 
 Notwithstanding these decisions, the Federal Court did rely on the Wardean 
Drilling test in Olympia and York Developments Ltd. v. Canada, a case in which a 
 
50 [1974] 2 F.C. 97, 74 D.T.C. 6569 (F.C.T.D.) [Lagueux & Frères cited to F.C.]:  
[F]iscal law is an accessory system, which applies only to the effects produced by 
contracts. Once the nature of the contracts is determined by the civil law, the Income
Tax Act comes into effect, but only then, to place fiscal consequences on those 
contracts. Without a contract, without a law and an obligation, there can be no fiscal 
levy. Application of the Income Tax Act is subject to a civil determination, whether such 
a determination be according to civil or common law (at 103). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. at 106, citing art. 1013 C.C.L.C. (“When the meaning of the parties in a contract is doubtful, 
their common intention must be determined by interpretation rather than by an adherence to the literal 
meaning of the words of the contract”); Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Traité pratique de droit civil 
français, t. 10 by Joseph Hamel, François Givord & André Tunc, 2d ed. (Paris: Librairie générale de 
droit et de jurisprudence, 1956) No. 220; Gravel c. Massicotte et Couillard (1931), 52 B.R. 146; 
Carey c. Carey (1912), 42 C.S. 471; A.R. Williams Machinery & Supply v. Morin, [1933] S.C.R. 570, 
4 D.L.R. 818. 
53 [1973] C.T.C. 2174, 27 D.T.C. 134 (T. Rev. B.) [Chibougamau Lumber cited to C.T.C.]. 
54 Ibid. at 2178 (emphasizing that the contracts were “never intended ... to be a true reflection of the 
arrangement” and were therefore shams or artificial transactions subject to the anti-avoidance rule in 
then s. 137(1) of the ITA). 
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taxpayer conveyed possession of an apartment building in 1969 under an agreement 
and retained ownership until it received a stipulated amount through instalment 
payments.55 Although concluding on the basis of civil law authorities that the 
taxpayer had not sold the property in 1969, Justice Addy nonetheless held that the 
taxpayer had disposed of the property in that year for two reasons: First, he explained, 
because the statutory definition of a disposition in then paragraph 20(5)(c) (now 
subsection 248(1)) was not “exhaustive or restrictive,”56 the concept should be given 
its “broadest possible meaning.”57 Second, he declared, since the concept of an 
acquisition is “obviously the direct opposite” of a disposition, the twofold test in 
Wardean Drilling should apply to determine the disposition of property as well as its 
acquisition.58 On this basis, the court concluded that the taxpayer disposed of the 
property in 1969 when it “completely divested itself of all of the duties, 
responsibilities and charges of ownership and also all of the profits, benefits and 
incidents of ownership, except the legal title.”59 
 Although Olympia and York was followed in at least one subsequent decision 
involving a disposition of property in Quebec,60 other decisions in the early 1990s 
continued to apply the civil law rather than Wardean Drilling to decide if a taxpayer 
had acquired property for the purposes of the ITA. In Fortin & Moreau, for example, 
a taxpayer sought to deduct capital cost allowance on garbage trucks and bins that it 
had leased for a sixty-five-month term with a purchase option after sixty months at a 
price less than the probable value of the equipment at that time.61 The Tax Court of 
Canada relied on the civil law, not Wardean Drilling, to conclude that the taxpayer 
had not acquired depreciable property within the meaning of the ITA. Emphasizing 
that “the Code does not recognize [the] ... dismemberment of ownership rights” 
presumed by the second branch of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling,62 Chief 
Justice Couture of the Tax Court of Canada characterized the contract as a “a 
conditional obligation on a suspensive condition,” which does not transfer ownership 
until the purchase option is exercised.63 He thereby disallowed the deduction on the 
 
55 (1980), [1981] 1 F.C. 691, 34 D.T.C. 6184 (T.D.) [Olympia and York cited to F.C.]. 
56 Ibid. at 709. 
57 Ibid., citing Canada v. Cie Immobilière BCN ltée (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 865 at 876, 97 D.L.R. 
(3d) 238 [Cie Immobilière]. 
58 Olympia and York, ibid. (An acquisition within the meaning of the ITA “must contain substantially 
the same elements viewed from the side of the person acquiring the asset as opposed to the person 
disposing of it” at 709). 
59 Ibid. at 710. 
60 See Robert Bédard auto ltée v. M.N.R., [1985] 2 C.T.C. 2354, 39 D.T.C. 643 (T.C.C.). 
61 Supra note 11. 
62 Ibid. at 2595, citing art. 406 C.C.L.C. (“Ownership is the right of enjoying and of disposing of 
things in the most absolute manner, provided that no use be made of them which is prohibited by law 
or by regulation”). 
63 Ibid. at 2596 (“Writers are of the opinion that the suspensive obligation does not transfer the right 
of ownership on the date of execution of the agreement. Ownership is only transferred to the 
purchaser when the condition is fulfilled, with retroactive effect to the date of the agreement”). The 
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ground that the applicable statutory definition of “depreciable property” required the 
taxpayer to own the property at the end of its taxation year in order to have acquired 
the property for tax purposes.64 Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, Chief 
Justice Couture relied on the second branch of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling to 
conclude that the taxpayer had acquired property for the purpose of the interest 
deduction in paragraph 20(1)(c) and the investment tax credit in subsection 127(10) 
on the basis that these provisions, unlike the definition of depreciable property, did 
not require the taxpayer to own the property at the end of the year.65 
 Fortin & Moreau was followed in two subsequent tax cases in Quebec, each of 
which involved leasing agreements with an option to purchase during the term of the 
lease.66 Chief Justice Couture’s conclusion that the taxpayer had not acquired 
depreciable property within the meaning of the ITA was also upheld on appeal by way 
of trial de novo at the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court affirmed his 
opinion that capital cost allowance may only be deducted by the owner of the 
property, and his determination that the contract did not transfer ownership of the 
property until the purchase option was exercised.67 Unlike the Tax Court of Canada, 
however, the Federal Court also disallowed the deduction of the interest expenses and 
investment tax credits claimed by the taxpayer on the ground that it had not acquired 
the property for the purpose of these provisions, or fulfilled the statutory definition of 
depreciable property. Rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that it had acquired the 
property under the second branch of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling, Justice 
Tremblay-Lamer distinguished Wardean Drilling on the basis that it had not involved 
an option to purchase, and declined to apply its twofold test to the lease-option 
agreements because this would produce “a legal effect that fails to reflect the 
obligations created by the applicable private law, in this case the civil law.”68 As a 
                                                                                                                                       
legal nature and effect of conditional obligations in civil law are examined more fully at infra notes 
120ff. and accompanying text. 
64 Ibid. at 2597 (“Prior to the 1979 taxation year, the Act referred essentially to property acquired by 
a taxpayer during a fiscal year, but ... an amendment was made to the paragraph applicable to property 
acquired since December 11, 1979, requiring the taxpayer, from that date, to own such property, at the 
end of the year, that is, his taxation year”). 
65 Ibid. (“the agreement between the parties resulted, for the purposes of the Act, in the acquisition 
of property by the [taxpayer]. It had possession and use of the ... property and had assumed all the 
risks; furthermore it was almost certain [to] exercise the option to purchase when the agreement 
expired” at 2599). 
66 See Dumais, supra note 11 (the taxpayer could not deduct capital cost allowance because “it only 
had the rights of a lessee determined by the terms of the leasing contract” and was “therefore not the 
owner of this property” at 2658 [translated by author]). See also Gaétan Lévesque, supra note 11, 
Lamarre Proulx T.C.J. at para. 14 (ownership of property is “essential” for a taxpayer to deduct capital 
cost allowance). 
67 Bérou (F.C.T.D.), supra note 11 at para. 22. 
68 Ibid. at para. 58. Tremblay-Lamer J. explained that because the taxpayer’s acquisition of property 
in the case before her depended on this future and uncertain event, it was “difficult to conclude” that 
the taxpayer had “‘acquired’ the property prior to the exercise of this option, even if the term [was] 
given the expansive meaning of M.N.R. v. Wardean Drilling Limited” (at para. 57). 
2009] D.G. DUFF – BIJURALISM AND THE ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY IN THE ITA 437 
 
 
result, she concluded, “absent an irrevocable promise of purchase and sale, I am 
unable to conclude that there was an acquisition before the option was exercised.”69 
 On further appeal, however, a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial decision and allowed the deduction of capital cost allowance, interest 
expenses, and investment tax credits, on the ground that the taxpayer had acquired the 
property for the purposes of the ITA irrespective of its ownership under the civil law 
of Quebec.70 For Justice Desjardins, this conclusion rested on three propositions: 
First, she explained, through subparagraph 54(c)(v) of the statutory definition of a 
disposition71 and the interpretive rule in subsection 248(3),72 as these provisions then 
read, Parliament had “devised, for tax purposes and for all of Canada, a common 
concept covering the ideas of ‘disposition’ (‘disposition des biens’) and ‘beneficial 
ownership’ (‘propriété effective’), both in civil and common law.”73 Second, she 
emphasized, the parties themselves admitted that “the effect of s. 54(c)(v) was to 
incorporate into the Act the common law rule that property is subject to a disposition 
when there is a transfer of ‘beneficial ownership’, even though the ‘legal ownership’ 
remained unchanged.”74 Third, she declared, “the corollary of these provisions” is that 
“when there was a ‘disposition’ for a party to a contract the other party made an 
‘acquisition’ or obtained the ‘beneficial ownership’ of it.”75 As a result, she 
concluded: 
 
69 Ibid. at para. 62. 
70 Bérou, supra note 7. 
71 Ibid. at 182. According to this provision (an amended version of which now appears in ss. (e) and 
(f) of the definition of a “disposition” in s. 248(1) of the ITA), a disposition of property does not 
include “any transfer of property by virtue of which there is a change in the legal ownership of the 
property without any change in the beneficial ownership thereof” (Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, 
c. 63, s. 54(c)(v)).  
72 Bérou, ibid. at 183. According to this provision, which was subsequently amended:  
In its application in relation to the Province of Quebec, a reference in this Act to any 
property that is or was beneficially owned by any person shall be read as including a 
reference to property in relation to which any person has or had the full ownership 
whether or not the property is or was subject to a servitude, or has or had a right as a 
usufructurary, a lessee in an emphyteutic lease, an institute in a substitution or a 
beneficiary in a trust; and a reference in this Act to the beneficial owner of any property 
shall be read as including a reference to a person who has or had, accordingly as the 
context requires, such ownership as a right in relation to that property. 
73 Bérou, ibid. 
74 Ibid. Curiously, the provision does not actually state this, providing only that a transfer of legal 
ownership without a change in beneficial ownership does not constitute a disposition, not that a 
transfer of beneficial ownership without a change in legal ownership does constitute a disposition. For 
a similar observation, see Marie-Pierre Allard, “The Retroactive Effect of Conditional Obligations in 
Tax Law” (2001) 49 Can. Tax J. 1726 at 1796 [Marie-Pierre Allard, “Conditional Obligations”]. See 
also Duff, supra note 13 at 57-58. 
75 Bérou, ibid. at 183 (Desjardins J.A. cited Olympia and York (supra note 55) in support of this 
view). As explained in Part III of this paper, this proposition does not follow as a logical corollary of 
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[I]n so far as the leasing contracts in the case at bar may be seen as contracts 
recognizing “beneficial ownership” like the contracts given as examples in s. 
248(3) of the Act, the beneficial ownership of the dump trucks was acquired by 
the appellant when the contracts were concluded in 1982. ... Since the appellant 
had the possession and use of the dump trucks in addition to assuming the risk 
and obligations pertaining to them, it obtained “beneficial ownership” of that 
property in 1982.76 
 Similarly, Justice Létourneau based his conclusion that the taxpayer had acquired 
the property for tax purposes on the legislative intent expressed in subsection 248(3) 
to harmonize the civil law of Quebec with the common law of other provinces,77 on 
the judicial presumption that an acquisition of property is the counterpart of a 
disposition, and on the further proposition (which was admitted by the parties) that, 
under subparagraph 54(c)(v), there was “a disposition of property when there was a 
transfer of beneficial ownership even though the seller retained legal ownership.”78 In 
addition, he suggested, this conclusion was consistent with developments in the civil 
law, which “[o]ver the years, ... gradually and from necessity, has been adapted to 
correspond to certain commercial situations and particular subdivisions of the 
ownership right which the common law had devised to meet the demands of these 
situations.”79 As well, Justice Létourneau emphasized that these considerations 
provided a sound basis for the application in Quebec of the Canada Revenue 
Agency’s Interpretation Bulletin identifying circumstances in which it would consider 
a transaction to be a sale rather than a lease,80 and that “it would be inappropriate for 
                                                                                                                                       
then ss. 54(c)(v) and 248(3), but depends on Desjardins J.A.’s second proposition that the effect of s. 
54(c)(v) was to extend the definition of a disposition to include transfers of beneficial ownership, and 
on the judicial interpretation in Olympia and York that the concept of an acquisition is the “direct 
opposite” of a disposition and “must contain substantially the same elements from the side of the 
person acquiring the asset as opposed to the person disposing of it” (supra note 55 at 709). 
76 Bérou, ibid. at 184. 
77 Ibid. at 186 [footnotes omitted]. 
78 Ibid. at 188. 
79 Ibid. at 187. See also ibid. at 189 (“the trend in the civil law is to approximate more closely to the 
common law”); ibid. at 191-92 (civil law courts have often characterized lease-option agreements as 
instalment sales “in which the normal incidents of ownership (beneficial ownership) were transferred 
to the purchaser,” and the Court of Appeal of Québec concluded that the lessee under a leasing 
agreement “had acquired the property when he obtained beneficial ownership of it, even though he 
lacked the real right conferred by legal ownership”). 
80 Ibid. at 186. Canada Revenue Agency, Interpretation Bulletin IT-233R, “Lease-Option 
Agreements; Sale-Leaseback Agreements” (11 February 1983) at para. 3. This Interpretation Bulletin 
replaced IT-233 (14 July 1975), and was cancelled by the Canada Revenue Agency in 2001 because it 
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s statement in Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada that 
“the economic realities of a situation [cannot be used] to recharacterize a taxpayer’s bona fide legal 
relationships” ([1999] 3 S.C.R. 622 at 641, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 26). As a result, according to the Canada 
Revenue Agency, “the determination of whether a contract is a lease or sale is based on the legal 
relationships created by the terms of the agreement, rather than on any attempt to ascertain the 
underlying economic reality. Therefore, in the absence of a sham, it is our view that a lease is a lease 
and a sale is a sale” (Income Tax Technical News, No. 21 (14 June 2001)). 
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this Court to ignore or repudiate the content of the said Bulletin 17 years later, as the 
respondent is asking us to do in the case at bar.”81 As a result, he concluded, the 
taxpayer had acquired the property within the meaning of the ITA when it “obtained 
the usual incidents of the right of ownership over the property, namely possession, 
use and risk of loss, together with the obligations resulting from those incidents.”82 
 Dissenting, Justice Noël would have disallowed the deductions for three reasons: 
First, in the absence of a statutory definition, the concept of an acquisition of property 
“must be understood in its ordinary sense that is as referring to the acquisition of 
ownership of property.”83 Second, he emphasized, “in the absence of some indication 
to the contrary, ownership of property cannot be acquired otherwise than in 
accordance with the applicable private law.”84 Third, since the parties did not intend 
ownership of the property to be transferred until the purchase option was exercised, it 
followed that the taxpayer did not acquire the property for the purposes of the ITA 
until the option was exercised.85 
 Three years later, in Terexcavation, the Tax Court of Canada considered yet 
another lease-option agreement involving a tractor that the taxpayer leased for six 
months with an option to purchase at the end of the lease.86 Allowing the taxpayer’s 
appeal from an assessment disallowing the deduction of an investment tax credit on 
the grounds that the tractor was no longer new when the taxpayer acquired it at the 
end of the lease, Justice Lamarre Proulx relied on the second branch of the twofold 
test in Wardean Drilling to conclude that the taxpayer had acquired the tractor at the 
outset of the lease, which she characterized as “a financial lease for the purpose of 
acquiring property.”87 Significantly, Justice Lamarre Proulx declared: 
[I]t is a mistake to see the issue of the interpretation to be given to the term 
“acquired” as a debate between civil law and common law on the concept of 
ownership. In the Court's view, Wardean interpreted the meaning of the term 
“acquired” on the basis of the tax legislation. That interpretation may or may 
not correspond to the common law concept of ownership; that is not the point. 
The point is that this interpretation was made on the basis of the tax 
legislation.88 
As a result, she suggested, the concept of an acquisition of property has a tax meaning 
that is effectively dissociated from all private law concepts, even if its interpretation 
happens to correspond to the common law distinction between legal and beneficial 
 
81 Bérou, ibid. at 193. 
82 Ibid. at 186-87. 
83 Ibid. at 221 [emphasis in original]. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. at 225. 
86 Supra note 7. 
87 Ibid. at para. 39. 
88 Ibid. at para. 35. 
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ownership. As argued in Part III of this paper, it is doubtful that this conclusion can 
survive the enactment of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. 
II. The Ownership and Transfer of Property in Common Law and 
Civil Law 
 As the tax cases in the first part of this paper demonstrate, courts have generally 
referred to common law or civil law concepts in order to interpret the meaning of an 
acquisition of property for tax purposes—either explicitly as in Lagueux & Frères, 
Fortin & Moreau, the trial decision in Bérou (F.C.T.D.), and Justice Noël’s dissenting 
opinion on appeal, or implicitly as in Justice Cattanach’s twofold test in Wardean 
Drilling and subsequent cases that have relied on this test. Before considering the 
impact of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act on the meaning of this concept, it is 
useful to review the rules, principles, and concepts governing the ownership and 
transfer of property in common law and civil law in order to understand their possible 
impact on the meaning of an acquisition of property for tax purposes. 
A. The Ownership and Transfer of Property in Common Law 
 The concept of ownership in the common law tradition is generally understood as 
“an enforceable bundle of rights that links a person to a thing.”89 As A.M. Honoré 
explains in a much-cited article on the subject: “Ownership comprises the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the 
right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidents of transmissibility and 
absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and the incident 
of residuarity.”90 For Bruce Ziff, these rights may be reduced to the following four: (1) 
possession, management, and control; (2) income and capital; (3) transmission inter
vivos and on death; and (4) protection under the law.91 
 In addition to this bundle of rights concept, the common law generally 
distinguishes between “legal” and “beneficial” ownership—a distinction that 
originates in the common law of trusts, but has developed a legal meaning that 
extends beyond the relationship between trustees and beneficiaries.92 Most property in 
common law jurisdictions is held both legally and beneficially, such that the person 
with legal title also has the right to use and enjoyment.93 However, the concepts are 
widely used, as one commentator explains, “to distinguish a right or power one 
 
89 Derek Mendes da Costa & Richard J. Balfour, Property Law: Cases, Text and Materials, 2nd ed. 
by Eileen E. Gillese (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1990) at 2:1. 
90 “Ownership” in A.G. Guest, ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: A Collaborative Work (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961) 107 at 113. 
91 Principles of Property Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2006) at 2-3. 
92 Brown, supra note 9 at 452. 
93 Arthur Allen Leff, “The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment” (1985) 94 Yale L.J. 1855, s.v. 
“beneficial”. 
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possesses for his own use and enjoyment from one possessed for the use and 
enjoyment of another.”94 In these circumstances, the common law regards the person 
who holds legal title to the property as its “legal owner” and the person who 
possesses the bundle of rights comprising the “normal incident” of ownership as the 
“beneficial owner” of the property.95 Since the common law conceptualizes 
ownership as a bundle of rights, moreover, the beneficial owner is generally regarded 
as the “real” or “true” owner of the property.96 
 Where two parties enter into a contract to sell property, common law jurisdictions 
generally provide that the property is transferred to the buyer “at such time as the 
parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.”97 For this purpose, according to 
provincial sale of goods statutes, “regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the 
conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.”98 In addition, these statutes 
contain several rules “for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at 
which the property in goods is to pass to the buyer,” which generally apply “[u]nless 
a different intention appears.”99 In Wardean Drilling, the court relied on one of these 
rules to help determine when the taxpayer had acquired the property for tax 
purposes.100 In other cases, courts have relied on more general principles to determine 
if, and when, property has passed to a purchaser of goods. The most difficult of these 
cases involve conditional sales agreements and lease-option agreements—in each of 
which legal title to the property remains with the vendor or lessor until the conditions 
are satisfied or the purchase option is exercised. 
 Where conditional sales agreements are involved, courts in common law 
provinces have generally held that the purchaser acquires either property in the 
goods, or equitable ownership, once possession, use, and risk are transferred.101 In 
 
94 Ibid. 
95 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., s.v. “beneficial owner”. 
96 See e.g. Csak v. Aumon (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 567 (Ont. H.C.J.) (the beneficial owner of 
property is “the real owner of the property even though it is in someone else’s name” at 567); 
MacKeen Estate v. Nova Scotia (1977), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 572, (sub nom. Cowan v. Nova Scotia 
(Minister of Finance)) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 66 (S.C.(T.D.)) (“the plain ordinary meaning of the expression 
‘beneficial owner’ is the real or true owner of the property” N.S.R. at para. 46), aff’d (1978), 28 
N.S.R. (2d) 3, 89 D.L.R. (3d) 426. 
97 See e.g. the Alberta Sale of Goods Act, supra note 21, ss. 19(1)-(2). Identical provisions appear in 
sale of goods statutes in other common law provinces. 
98 Ibid., s. 198(2). 
99 Ibid., s. 20(1). 
100 Supra note 6. See especially supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
101 See e.g. R. v. Hemingway, [1955] S.C.R. 712 at para. 38, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 34, Estey J. (the accused 
was found guilty of obtaining goods by false pretences on the basis that he had “acquired possession 
of the goods and a special property or interest therein” pursuant to a conditional sales agreement with 
the vendor); C.C. Motor Sales Ltd. v. Chan, [1926] S.C.R. 485 at 491, [1926] 3 D.L.R. 712 (the 
plaintiff, who had purchased an automobile under a conditional sales agreement, was entitled to the 
excess of proceeds over unpaid instalment payments after the defendant took possession of the vehicle 
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Hendrickson, for example, the plaintiff sued the defendant for conversion after the 
defendant purchased and resold an automobile from an individual who acquired it 
under a false name from the plaintiff pursuant to a conditional sales agreement.102 The 
Alberta Supreme Court found for the defendant on the basis that the conditional sales 
agreement had transferred property in the goods to the individual, notwithstanding 
that the vendor retained title to the goods until all amounts owing were paid. 
According to the court: 
 It will be observed that what is reserved to the vendor until payment in full 
is “title” to the said goods. Nowhere in the agreement is it stated that “property” 
in the goods shall remain in the vendor until payment in full. Now, I conceive 
“title” and “property” to be two entirely different things. One person may hold 
bare title to property while the whole beneficial ownership rests in some other 
person. A reservation of title does not necessarily imply that no property shall 
pass to the purchaser, and indeed the agreement itself contemplates that some 
property interest will pass to this purchaser.103 
As Justice Noël observed in Hewlett Packard, the language and reasoning that Justice 
Cattanach employed in Wardean Drilling is similar to that in Hendrickson.104
 Where possession is conveyed under a lease with a purchase option, courts in 
common law provinces have generally distinguished between “true leases” under 
which the essential incidents of ownership remain with the lessor, and “financing 
leases” or “security leases,” under which the lessee acquires beneficial ownership 
while the lessor retains legal title as a form of security interest.105 Although the 
distinction between these two kinds of leases is often difficult to draw in practice,106 
factors favouring characterization as a financing or security lease include: (1) 
automatic vesting of ownership in the lessee at the end of the lease or upon payment 
of a stipulated amount, or an obligation to purchase the property at the end of the 
lease; (2) a lease term that corresponds to the property’s useful life; (3) lease 
payments that are equal to or greater than the sum of the property’s capital and 
finance costs; (4) an option price lower than the expected value of the property when 
the option may be exercised; (5) lease terms allocating the loss or gain from a 
subsequent disposition of the property to the lessee; (6) transactions in which the 
lessor purchases property from a supplier selected by the lessee for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                       
and sold it under the provisions of the agreement, on the grounds that the plaintiff had acquired 
equitable ownership of the property, notwithstanding that the defendant retained legal ownership).  
102 Supra note 24. 
103 Ibid. at 283-84. 
104 Supra note 23. 
105 See Ronald C.C. Cuming, Catherine Walsh & Roderick J. Wood, Personal Property Security 
Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) at 67-75. 
106 See e.g. Re Philip Services Corp. (1999), 15 C.B.R. (4th) 107, 94 A.C.W.S. (3d) 13 (Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.), Farley J. (“the task involves a weighing of the various material matters involved. It is not a 
simple analysis of determining between black and white but rather the shade of grey where all factors 
are weighed in the balance as to whether the scales would tip towards a true lease relationship—or 
alternatively against being a true lease relationship” at 109). 
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leasing the property to the lessee; and (7) contractual remedies characteristic of a 
financing transaction, such as acceleration of payments in the event of default.107 
Although none of the tax cases in common law provinces involving lease-option 
agreements have cited any of the common law judgments in which these factors have 
been applied, most have considered similar factors in order to determine whether 
lessees have acquired property for tax purposes under the terms of the agreement.108 
These factors may also have influenced the Canada Revenue Agency’s administrative 
practice, as they correspond to the circumstances under which the Canada Revenue 
Agency was formerly prepared to characterize lease-option agreements as sales rather 
than as leases.109 
B. The Ownership and Transfer of Property in Civil Law 
 Unlike the common law, the civil law of Quebec regards ownership as absolute 
and indivisible. According to the Civil Code of Québec, ownership is defined as “the 
right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely, subject to the limits and 
conditions for doing so determined by law.”110 In addition, the C.C.Q. continues, 
ownership of property “gives a right to what it produces and to what is united to it,”111 
so that the “fruits and revenues of property belong to the owner.”112 As Henri 
Mazeaud explains, while the right of ownership under the civil law comprises three 
attributes—“the jus utendi, or right to make use of the thing, the jus fruendi, or right 
to receive income produced by it, and the jus abutendi, or right to dispose of the 
thing: to preserve, give, sell, destroy or abandon it”—this right is a “total right” 
 
107 See Cuming, Walsh & Wood, supra note 105 at 70-75. 
108 See e.g. Mimetix, supra note 7 (where the definitive factor was the absence of an option to 
purchase “at a price substantially less than the probable fair market value of the property at the time of 
exercising the option” at 2211); Kamsel Leasing, supra note 42 (lessees have the right to acquire the 
property at the expiration of the lease “at a price which at the inception of the lease could be said to be 
substantially less than the probable fair market value of the property at the time of permitted 
acquisition” at 2283). 
109 See Interpretation Bulletin IT-233R, supra note 80. The Canada Revenue Agency cancelled this 
Interpretation Bulletin on the grounds that “the determination of whether a contract is a lease or sale is 
based on the legal relationships created by the terms of the agreement, rather than on any attempt to 
ascertain the underlying economic reality” (Income Tax Technical News, No. 21, supra note 80). The 
apparent correspondence between the factors used by common law courts to distinguish true leases 
from financing and security leases and the factors listed in the Interpretation Bulletin suggest that this 
decision may have been misconceived. These factors can determine the legal relationships created by 
the agreement as well as the economic reality. 
110 Art. 947 C.C.Q. [emphasis added].  
111 Ibid., art. 948. 
112 Ibid., art. 949 (adding that the owner “bears the costs he incurred to produce” these fruits and 
revenues). See also ibid., art. 950 (the owner of the property “assumes the risks of loss”). 
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giving the owner “complete powers over the thing.”113 As a result, it follows, while 
the C.C.Q. contemplates various “dismemberments” of ownership in the form of a 
usufruct, use, servitude, or emphyteusis, these dismemberments do not transfer 
ownership itself, which remains with the original owner subject to the right or charge 
created by the dismemberment.114 Nor does the civil law of Quebec recognize the 
common law distinction between legal and beneficial ownership, since these concepts 
are merged within a unitary conception of ownership.115 
 Despite these differences between the civil law and the common law, both legal 
systems share the principle that contracts for the sale of property are to be interpreted 
according to the intent of the parties.116 According to the C.C.Q., “[t]he common 
intention of the parties rather than adherence to the literal meaning of the words shall 
be sought in interpreting a contract.”117 Professor Jobin explains that even where the 
wording of a contract does not seem ambiguous, the judge may depart from the 
declared will of the parties and adopt an interpretation of the contract that is more 
consistent with their true intention. Thus, the formal qualification of a contract as a 
sale or as a lease does not oblige the judge to apply the rules relative to these types of 
contracts.118 Similarly, the Superior Court of Québec ruled in Thibault v. Auger that in 
order to determine the legal effect of a contract, “one must look for the intention of 
the parties, whatever the name they may give it. ... if the contract that [the parties] call 
a lease displays all the characteristics of a sale, it will be governed not by the 
principles of lease but by those of sale.”119
 With respect to the characterization of contracts, the C.C.Q. contemplates 
different kinds of sales and different kinds of leasing arrangements. Where a seller 
transfers possession, use, and risk to a buyer, but retains ownership pending full 
payment of the purchase price, the transaction is defined as an “instalment sale”.120 
While an instalment sale creates an existing obligation to transfer ownership once the 
purchase price is paid in full, this obligation constitutes an “obligation with a 
 
113 Henri Mazeaud et al., Leçons de droit civil, t. 2, vol. 2, 8th ed. by François Chabas (Paris: 
Montchrestien, 1994) No. 1332, cited in Cie Immobilière, supra note 57 at 876-877 [translated in Cie
Immobilière, emphasis in original]). 
114 See arts. 1119, 1120 (usufruct), 1172 (use), 1177 (servitude), 1195 (emphyteusis) C.C.Q. 
115 See e.g. Laliberté v. LaRue (1930), [1931] S.C.R. 7, [1931] 2 D.L.R. 12, Rinfret J. (“[T]he legal 
system in the Province of Quebec does not include the common law concept which recognizes 
beneficial ownership in one person and legal title in another. In Quebec, both are invariably combined 
in the same person. Ownership is unitary” S.C.R. at 16 [translated by author]). It follows that a civil 
law trust is conceptually unlike a common law trust. The civil law trust property is owned neither by 
the trustee nor the beneficiary but by an “autonomous and distinct” patrimony in which neither the 
trustee nor the beneficiary has rights as an owner (art. 1261 C.C.Q.). 
116 See Bérou, supra note 7 at 225. 
117 Art. 1425 C.C.Q. 
118 Pierre-Gabriel Jobin with the collaboration of Nathalie Vézina, Les obligations, 6th ed. 
(Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005) No. 435. 
119 [1950] C.S. 343 at 345 [translated by author]. 
120 Art. 1745 C.C.Q. 
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suspensive term” that “does not become exigible until the occurrence of a future and 
certain event.”121 As such, an instalment sale does not transfer ownership until the 
term is complete—when the buyer has paid the full amount of the purchase price.122 
 In contrast to instalment sales, which create obligations with a suspensive term, 
the C.C.Q. also contemplates transactions which create conditional obligations. 
According to article 1497, “[a]n obligation is conditional where it is made to depend 
upon a future and uncertain event, either by suspending it until the event occurs or is 
certain not to occur, or by making its extinction dependent on whether or not the 
event occurs.”  
 Where a conditional obligation is suspended until a future and uncertain event 
occurs or is certain not to occur, the condition is suspensive and the obligation comes 
into existence only when the event occurs or is certain not to occur.123 Where a 
conditional obligation is extinguished by the occurrence of a future and uncertain 
event, the condition is resolutory and the obligation comes into existence when the 
contract is concluded, but ceases upon the occurrence of the future and uncertain 
event.124 Although the C.C.Q. is not explicit on the matter, civil law authorities agree 
that the future and uncertain event upon which the conditional obligation depends 
must be “extrinsic to the legal relationship” between the parties,125 which 
distinguishes this kind of transaction from an instalment sale in which the suspensive 
term that the price must be paid in full is intrinsic to the contract.126 As well, since the 
C.C.Q. provides that “fulfillment of the condition has a retroactive effect, between the 
parties and with respect to third persons, to the day on which the debtor obligated 
himself conditionally,”127 a sale on a suspensive condition is further distinguished 
from an instalment sale by making the transfer of ownership on fulfillment of the 
condition retroactive to when the agreement was executed.128 
 In addition to these different kinds of sales transactions, the C.C.Q. also 
contemplates different kinds of leasing arrangements. Under a conventional lease, 
ownership remains with the lessor, who “undertakes to provide ... the lessee, in return 
for a rent, with the enjoyment of a movable or immovable property for a certain 
time.”129 Under a contract of leasing, on the other hand, the lessor “puts movable 
 
121 Art. 1508 C.C.Q. 
122 Marie-Pierre Allard, “Conditional Obligations”, supra note 74 at 1747. 
123 Ibid. at 1730. 
124 Ibid. at 1731. 
125 Henri Mazeaud et al., Leçons de droit civil, t. 2, vol. 1, 9th ed. by François Chabas (Paris: 
Montchrestien, 1998) at 1078-79 [translated by author]. See also Jobin, Les obligations, supra note 
118, No. 611.  
126 See e.g. Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec v. Venne, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
880 at 903-04, 95 N.R. 335, Beetz J. See also Jobin, Les obligations, ibid., No. 605. 
127 Art. 1506 C.C.Q. 
128 Marie-Pierre Allard, “Conditional Obligations”, supra note 74 at 1730. 
129 Art. 1851 C.C.Q. 
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property at the disposal of ... the lessee, for a fixed term and in return for payment” 
after “acquir[ing] the property that is the subject of the leasing from a third person, at 
the demand and in accordance with the instructions of the lessee.”130 Although some 
authorities suggest that a leasing agreement is “a financial operation tending to the 
acquisition of ownership by the user” when it is combined with an option to purchase 
the property,131 the more accurate view is that the promise of a sale accompanied by 
yet unfulfilled conditions is not equivalent to a sale,132 and that an option to purchase 
property subject to a leasing agreement cannot confer ownership until the option is 
exercised.133 Indeed, although the lessee under a leasing arrangement may, as Justice 
Létourneau observed in Bérou, be “treated ... like an owner purchaser” in “economic 
terms”,134 the C.C.Q. itself states that “[t]he lessor acquires the property that is the 
subject of the leasing,”135 and Justice Létourneau himself acknowledged that a leasing 
agreement does not confer upon the lessee the real right to the property.136 
 Although most of the tax cases in Quebec involving lease-option agreements 
have considered these civil law rules and principles, they have reached widely 
different conclusions on the legal consequences of these rules and principles and on 
their implications for the acquisition of property under the ITA. For example, in 
 
130 Art. 1842 C.C.Q. 
131 Claude Gilbert, “La nature et l’intérêt du crédit-bail en informatique” (1988) 29 C. de D. 815 at 
819-20, cited in Bérou, supra note 7 at 190, Létourneau J.A. See also Pacific National Leasing Corp. 
c. Rose, [2001] R.J.Q. 78. 
132 Léon Faribault, Traité de droit civil du Québec, vol. 11 (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1961) No. 
116, cited in Bérou (F.C.T.D.), supra note 11 at para. 44: “even when it is accompanied by delivery, a 
promise to sell is not equivalent to a sale where it is made subject to a suspensive condition, or where 
the parties have agreed that the prospective vendor is to retain ownership of the res until the purchase 
price is paid in full or until the promisee has fulfilled all his obligations” [translated by author]. See 
also Robertson v. Canada, [1990] 2 F.C. 717, 105 N.R. 123, Marceau J. (“We cannot look at the 
taxpayer who exercises the option as if he had owned the shares all along; the power to acquire the 
shares should not be confused with ownership of the shares itself” F.C. at 726); Mitsui & Co. 
(Canada) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 187, 142 N.S.R. (2d) 1, Major J. (“An option 
contract is an antecedent contract because it precedes the contract of purchase and sale that will result 
if the opportunity provided by the option is ‘seized upon’ or exercised. Once an option is exercised, 
the parties discharge their obligations under the option contract by entering into the contract of 
purchase and sale” S.C.R. at 201). Article 1710 of the C.C.Q. states that “The promise of sale with 
delivery and actual possession is equivalent to sale,” but it is possible to depart from this presumption 
where the parties have established conditions to be fulfilled before the transfer of ownership. See e.g. 
Nadeau c. Dulac, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 164; Matériaux J.C. Brunet c. Caron, [2003] R.D.I. 18, 23 C.L.R. 
(3d) 198.  
133 Pierre-Gabriel Jobin, Le louage, 2d ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1996) at 52 (an option to 
purchase is a mere possibility. The essence of a leasing is to confer a jus ad rem, not a real right).  
134 Supra note 7 at para. 23. See e.g. arts. 1845 (the seller of the property is “directly bound towards 
the lessee by the legal and conventional warranties inherent in the contract of sale”), 1846 C.C.Q. (the 
lessee “assumes all the risks of loss of the property, even by superior force, from the time he takes 
possession of it” and “likewise assumes all maintenance and repair expenses”). 
135 Art. 1842 C.C.Q. [emphasis added]. 
136 Bérou, supra note 7 at para. 23. 
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Chibougamau Lumber, the Tax Review Board characterized the agreement as “a 
purchase on a time payment plan” and concluded on this basis that the transaction 
transferred ownership of the property to the lessee.137 In Lagueux & Frères, on the 
other hand, Justice Décary characterized the agreement as a sale on a suspensive 
condition, but also concluded that the transaction had transferred ownership of the 
property to the lessee.138 In Fortin & Moreau, Chief Justice Couture also 
characterized the contract as a sale on a suspensive condition, but concluded that the 
transaction did not transfer ownership on the grounds that a suspensive obligation 
does not transfer ownership until the condition is fulfilled, with retroactive effect to 
the date of the agreement.139 In Bérou (F.C.T.D.), Justice Tremblay-Lamer concluded 
that the contract could not be characterized as a sale on a suspensive condition on the 
grounds that an option to purchase property is “a condition intrinsic to the contract, 
which depends on the will of one of the parties.”140 He therefore held that the 
taxpayer had not obtained ownership under civil law or acquired the property for tax 
purposes until the purchase option was exercised.141 On further appeal to the Federal 
Court of Appeal, Justice Noël concurred with this view, whereas Justices Desjardins 
and Létourneau dissociated the tax concept of an acquisition of property from civil 
law rules and principles governing the transfer of ownership, concluding instead that 
the taxpayer had acquired “beneficial ownership” of the property under the twofold 
test in Wardean Drilling.142 Likewise, in Terexcavation, Justice Lamarre Proulx 
dissociated the tax concept of an acquisition of property from the civil law of Quebec, 
emphasizing that the meaning of an acquisition of property for tax purposes must be 
understood on the basis of the tax legislation rather than the private law of the 
province in which the relevant transaction occurs.143 
 As the next part of this paper explains, it is doubtful whether the Federal Court of 
Appeal decision in Bérou and the subsequent Tax Court of Canada judgment in 
Terexcavation remain valid after the enactment of section 8.1 of the Interpretation 
Act. If invalid, moreover, the cases decided prior to these two judgments suggest that 
the meaning of an acquisition of property may be subject to considerable uncertainty 
in the Province of Quebec. 
 
137 Supra note 53 at 2178. 
138 Supra note 50 at 692-93. However, Décary J. is less specific elsewhere in his judgment. He states 
that the contracts resulted in “a sale on a suspensive condition, on instalment or by leasing” (at 691). 
As explained in this section, these alternatives are treated differently under the C.C.Q. 
139 Supra note 11 at 2596. 
140 Supra note 11 at para. 40 [emphasis added]. Tremblay-Lamer J. considered it unnecessary to 
determine whether the transaction should be characterized as an instalment sale (as opposed to a 
leasing with a purchase option), explaining that the legal consequences resulting from such a 
characterization would not affect the outcome, since “the contract would be formed upon the payment 
of the final fraction of the price” (ibid. at para. 48). 
141 Ibid. at para. 62. 
142 Bérou, supra note 7. 
143 Supra note 7 at para. 35.  
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III. Canadian Bijuralism and the Meaning of an Acquisition of 
Property in the Income Tax Act 
 Although the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Bérou effectively dissociated 
the tax concept of an acquisition of property from the civil law of Quebec, the 
judgment was released on 15 November 1999, well before the introduction of section 
8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act, which came into force on 1 June 2001.144 
Declaring the common law and the civil law to be “equally authoritative and 
recognized sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada,” this provision 
stipulates that where it is necessary to refer to provincial law in interpreting an 
enactment, “unless otherwise provided by law ... reference must be made to the rules, 
principles or concepts in force in the province at the time [an] enactment is being 
applied.”145 Therefore, to the extent that the interpretation of an acquisition of 
property under the ITA necessitates reference to provincial law, section 8.1 of the 
Interpretation Act may mandate a different result from that reached by a majority of 
the Federal Court of Appeal. 
 This part of this paper considers the impact of section 8.1 of the federal 
Interpretation Act on the meaning of an acquisition of property in the ITA, asking 
whether it is necessary to refer to provincial “rules, principles or concepts forming 
part of the law of property and civil rights” in order to interpret this concept and, if 
so, whether such a reference has been “otherwise provided by law.” In order to 
properly address these questions, however, it begins by reviewing section 8.1 more 
generally in light of the broader objectives of Canadian bijuralism. 
A. Canadian Bijuralism and Section 8.1 of the Federal Interpretation 
Act146
 Section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act was enacted in 2001 as part of the 
Federal Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act, No.1,147 the first in a series of legislative 
measures designed to advance the goals of Canadian bijuralism by harmonizing 
federal legislation with the civil law of Quebec. Defined narrowly as “the coexistence 
of two legal traditions within a single state,”148 bijuralism may also be understood 
more broadly as “the sharing of values and traditions” associated with each of the two 
legal systems.149 In Canada, bijuralism of the first kind is rooted in the Quebec Act of 
 
144 Terexcavation was decided after this provision was enacted, but the court did not consider it. 
145 Interpretation Act, supra note 14. 
146 Part III.A is based on Duff, supra note 13. 
147 S.C. 2001, c. 4. For a detailed review of the origins and content of this legislation, see Marie-
Noëlle Pourbaix, “S-4: A First Harmonization Bill” in Harmonization, supra note 13, fasc. 6 at 1-12. 
148 Marie-Claude Gervais & Marie-France Séguin, “Some Thoughts on Bijuralism in Canada and 
the World” in Harmonization, ibid., fasc. 2 at 1. 
149 Justice Michel Bastarache, “Bijuralism in Canada” in Harmonization, ibid., fasc. 1, 19 at 26. 
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1774,150 which provided that French law would apply to matters of property and civil 
rights in the Province of Quebec, and is confirmed by the Constitution Act, 1867,151 
which grants exclusive authority to provincial governments to make laws in relation 
to “Property and Civil Rights”.152 Bijuralism of the second kind is cultural and 
aspirational, but finds expression in federal policies and enactments, and in the 
evolving jurisprudence of Canadian courts.153 
 Although bijuralism as narrowly defined has existed in Canada since 1774, 
recognition of the civil law tradition at the federal level is a relatively recent 
development. Until the 1970s, federal legislation was typically drafted by English-
speaking lawyers trained in the common law and then translated into French by 
translators with little or no legal training, with “makeshift” adjustments to 
accommodate the interaction of this legislation and the civil law of Quebec.154 At the 
same time, Supreme Court of Canada decisions routinely ignored the distinctive 
character of the civil law of Quebec, interpreting provisions of the Civil Code of 
Lower Canada in light of English authorities and common law concepts.155  
 With the development of official bilingualism and biculturalism at the federal 
level in the 1960s and 1970s, these unijural approaches to legislative drafting and 
judicial decision-making became increasingly anachronistic and unacceptable. In 
1975, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly recognized the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada as “radically different” from the common law, and acknowledged that its 
provisions “must be interpreted in keeping with the whole of which it is a part.”156 
Over the next few years, the Court established the basis for a complementary 
relationship between federal legislation and provincial private law through a series of 
decisions interpreting the words “Laws of Canada” for the purpose of section 101 of 
the Constitution Act, 1867 to require a federal statutory text.157 In 1978 the federal 
 
150 An Act for making more effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec in 
North America, (U.K.) 14 Geo. III, c. 83. 
151 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
152 Ibid., s. 92(13). 
153 On bijuralism in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, see France Allard, “The Supreme 
Court of Canada and its Impact on the Expression of Bijuralism” in Harmonization, supra note 13,
fasc. 3 [France Allard, “The Expression of Bijuralism”]; Louise Lavallée, “Bijuralism in the Supreme 
Court of Canada since the Enactment of the Civil Code of Quebec” in Harmonization, supra note 13, 
fasc. 3. For a notable judicial expression of bijuralism, see St-Hilaire v. Canada (A.G.), 2001 FCA 63, 
4 F.C. 289, 204 D.L.R. (4th) 103, Décary J.A., dissenting in part [St-Hilaire]. 
154 Lionel A. Levert, “The Cohabitation of Bilingualism and Bijuralism in Federal Legislation in 
Canada: Myth or Reality?” in Harmonization, ibid., fasc. 1, 5 at 6. 
155 See France Allard, “The Expression of Bijuralism”, supra note 153 at 3-12. 
156 Pantel v. Air Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 472 at 478, 48 D.L.R. (3d) 1. 
157 See Quebec North Shore Paper v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, 71 
D.L.R. (3d) 111; Canada v. McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, 75 D.L.R. 
(3d) 273; Canada v. Thomas Fuller Construction (1958) Ltd. (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695, 106 D.L.R. 
(3d) 193. For a useful discussion of these cases, see France Allard, “The Expression of Bijuralism”, 
supra note 153 at 22-26. 
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Department of Justice introduced a new method of drafting legislation, called 
“codrafting”, whereby all bills drafted by the Legislative Services Branch are 
prepared by two drafters—a francophone who is typically trained in the civil law, and 
an anglophone who is typically trained in the common law.158 
 Although bijural, this method of codrafting did not directly speak to francophone 
common law lawyers or anglophone civil law lawyers. Moreover, the new approach 
did not make bijuralism an explicit objective of the codrafting process. In June 1995, 
therefore, the Department of Justice adopted an explicit policy on legislative 
bijuralism, intended to “provid[e] Canadians with federal legislative texts that will 
reflect, in each linguistic version, the legal system in use in their province.”159 In 
general, this policy is designed to promote equal access to justice by different legal 
and linguistic communities in Canada, equal recognition of the civil and common law 
traditions in federal legislation, and a harmonious relationship between federal 
legislative objectives and these legal traditions.160 Moreover, given the historical 
dominance of common law concepts and principles in federal legislation, an 
important objective of this policy was also to ensure that federal legislation does not 
“treat Quebec Civil law as an inferior or subsidiary component of the Canadian legal 
tradition.”161 
 Three years after the adoption of this policy, the federal government introduced 
Bill C-50,162 containing amendments to various federal statutes relating to provincial 
private law,163 as well as to the federal Interpretation Act. Although Bill C-50 died on 
the Order Paper when the House of Commons was prorogued, and a subsequent 
version, Bill S-22,164 died when Parliament dissolved in the autumn of 2000, it was 
 
158 Levert, supra note 154 at 6. 
159 Department of Justice, Policy on Legislative Bijuralism, reproduced in Wellington, supra note 13 
at 22, app. 3. 
160 See Marie-Claude Gervais, “Program to Harmonize Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of 
the Province of Quebec, Assumption of Complementarity and Methodological Issues” in 
Harmonization, supra note 13, fasc. 1, 10 at 11-12. 
161 Roderick A. Macdonald, “Harmonizing the Concepts and Vocabulary of Federal and Provincial 
Law: The Unique Situation of Quebec Civil Law” in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with 
Quebec Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism: Collection of Studies (Ottawa: Department of Justice 
Canada, 1999) [Collection of Studies] 27 at 69. See also Levert, supra note 154 (emphasizing 
Parliament’s “moral duty to take the two systems of law into account in its legislation ... when it sets 
out standards the application of which intersects with provincial private law” at 5). 
162 A First Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of the Province of Quebec and to amend 
certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into account the common law and the 
civil law, 1st Sess., 36th Parl., 1998 (tabled in the House of Commons 12 June 1998). 
163 See e.g. Federal Real Property and Federal Immovables Act, S.C. 1991, c. 50; Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3; Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50. 
164 A First Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of the Province of Quebec and to amend 
certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into account the common law and the 
civil law, 2nd Sess., 36th Parl., 2000. 
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re-tabled at the opening of the subsequent Parliamentary session as Bill S-4,165 and 
enacted into law as the Federal Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1.166 The 
preamble to this legislation repeats the basic goals of the Department of Justice’s 
Policy on Legislative Bijuralism, and affirms a principle of “complementarity” 
between federal legislation and provincial private law. According to this principle, the 
private law of the relevant province in which a federal statute is applied is, unless 
otherwise provided by law, recognized as the body of law that “completes federal 
legislation” if it is otherwise incomplete. More importantly, the legislation also 
codifies this principle of complementarity in section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation 
Act.167 
 As explained earlier, this provision declares that “[b]oth the common law and the 
civil law are equally authoritative and recognized sources of the law of property and 
civil rights in Canada.” It further stipulates that “unless otherwise provided by law, if 
in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or 
concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made 
to the rules, principles or concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment 
is being applied.” As a result, section 8.1 recognizes the equal status of common law 
and civil law as “sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada,” mandates 
complementarity as the proper way to interpret federal legislation relating to 
provincial private law, and establishes an ambulatory principle according to which the 
relevant provincial source of reference is the private law “in force in the province at 
the time the enactment is being applied.” Crucially, however, the complementarity 
principle applies only if the two conditions set out in section 8.1 are met. Each of 
these conditions is itself a matter of statutory interpretation, which should presumably 
be guided by the broad aims and principles underlying Canadian bijuralism, 
particularly those expressed in the preamble to the Federal Law—Civil Law 
Harmonization Act, No. 1. 
 The first condition—that it must be “necessary” to refer to provincial sources of 
law concerning property and civil rights to interpret the enactment—seems to be 
satisfied where the legislation in question (1) employs a term that is not defined in 
federal legislation but has an established private law meaning, (2) relies on private 
law rules, principles, or concepts in order to define the legal relationships to which it 
 
165 A First Act to harmonize federal law with the civil law of the Province of Quebec and to amend 
certain Acts in order to ensure that each language version takes into account the common law and the 
civil law, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001. 
166 Supra note 152. 
167 9041-6868 Québec v. M.N.R., 2005 FCA 334, 350 N.R. 201, Décary J.A. (s. 8.1 “codified the 
principle that the private law of a province and a federal statute are complementary, which had been 
recognized [in St-Hilaire (supra note 153)] but had not always been put into practice.” The 
“immediate effect” of the provision was “to restore the role of the civil law in matters under the 
jurisdiction of this Court, to bring to light how the common law might have been borrowed from, over 
the years, in cases where Quebec civil law applied or should have applied, and to caution us against 
any such borrowing in the future” at para. 5). 
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applies, or (3) is silent on a matter that is governed by a specific provincial rule 
forming part of the law of property and civil rights. In these cases, since the 
enactment cannot be applied without relying on the private law rules, principles, or 
concepts that complete the federal legislation, it follows that these same rules, 
principles, or concepts are essential to the interpretation of the enactment.168 
Moreover, since the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that provincial governments 
have exclusive authority to make laws in relation to property and civil rights,169 the 
interpretation of the legislation must, unless it is otherwise provided by law, refer to 
provincial sources of law. Conversely, it is not necessary to refer to provincial private 
law to interpret concepts that are fully defined in federal legislation, statutory 
provisions that do not depend on “rules, principles or concepts forming part of the 
law of property or civil rights,” and legislation that explicitly precludes reliance on 
provincial private law.170 
 The second condition—which precludes what would otherwise be a necessary 
reference to provincial private law to interpret a federal enactment where it is 
“otherwise provided by law”—is clearly satisfied where the federal enactment 
explicitly dissociates the interpretation of a concept or provision from provincial 
private law.171 More difficult, however, are circumstances in which dissociation from 
provincial private law is implicit in the language or purposes of the statutory text. 
Where federal legislation relies on common law terms, for example, a necessary 
implication may be raised that its interpretation must be based on common law 
principles and dissociated from the civil law of Quebec.172 As well, with much federal 
legislation, it is a reasonable presumption that Parliament intends its laws to apply 
uniformly throughout Canada,173 and this is particularly so in the field of taxation 
where equity and anti-avoidance considerations can weigh heavily.174 As a result, it 
 
168 For a concurring interpretation, see Henry L. Molot, “Clause 8 of Bill S-4: Amending the 
Interpretation Act” in Harmonization, supra note 13, fasc. 6, 1 at 16. 
169 Supra note 151, s. 92(13). 
170 Molot, supra note 168: 
For example, [federal] legislation could so comprehensively define its terms as to 
implicitly exclude any reference to provincial private law as the external source of 
interpretation and application. Federal legislation could also expressly refer to some 
other external source of interpretation thereby demonstrating a contrary intent as 
regards it being “necessary to refer to a province’s rules ... ” (at 18). 
171 See ibid. (suggesting that the expression “unless otherwise provided by law” is triggered only by 
an express “legislative provision to the contrary” at 19). 
172 See e.g. Jean-Maurice Brisson & André Morel, “Federal Law and Civil Law: Complementarity, 
Dissociation” in Collection of Studies, supra note 161, 217 at 235. See also André Morel, 
“Harmonizing Federal Legislation with the Civil Code of Québec: Why and Wherefore?” in 
Collection of Studies, supra note 161, 1 (explaining that this “helps create the impression that there is 
a sort of organic bond, an association inherent in the nature of things, between federal law and 
common law—and the language used in those statutes tends to reinforce that impression” at 6). 
173 See e.g. Brisson & Morel, ibid.; Bastarache, supra note 149 at 21. 
174 See e.g. Brisson & Morel, ibid. at 237; Morel, supra note 172 at 7. 
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might be argued, undefined private law concepts in federal legislation should be 
given their common law meanings in order to ensure conceptual coherence and 
uniformity throughout Canada. 
 Although the principle of Parliamentary supremacy dictates that courts should 
dissociate the interpretation of federal legislation from the private law of one or more 
provinces where Parliament’s intention is clear, the goals of Canadian bijuralism 
suggest that this should be done only when this intention is stated explicitly or 
necessarily implied by the language of the statutory text.175 As Professor Macdonald 
explains, “forcing Parliament itself to make its choices explicitly is the best guarantee 
that the distinctive civil law and common law traditions in Canada will be respected 
in any legislative reordering.”176 Nor should previous judicial decisions be regarded 
as “law” within the meaning of the exclusion in section 8.1 of the federal 
Interpretation Act, since this approach would render the provision largely 
meaningless. 
B. Section 8.1 of the Federal Interpretation Act and the Concept of 
an Acquisition of Property in the Income Tax Act 
 Returning to the concept of an acquisition of property in the ITA, the judicial 
decisions examined in the first part of this paper provide a number of arguments that 
are relevant to the two conditions in section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act. The 
following sections consider each of these conditions. 
1. The Need to Refer to Private Law 
 Beginning with the first of these conditions, the strongest arguments against any 
need to refer to private law rules, principles, or concepts in order to interpret the 
meaning of an acquisition of property for tax purposes are: (1) that this concept can 
be understood according to the ordinary meaning of these words; and (2) that the 
concept can be interpreted, as Justice Lamarre Proulx suggested in Terexcavation, “on 
the basis of the tax legislation” without resorting to private law.177 To the extent that 
the concept of an acquisition of property has an ordinary meaning that does not 
depend on private law rules, principles, or concepts, it follows that it is not necessary 
 
175 See e.g. Roderick A. Macdonald, “Provincial Law and Federal Commercial Law: Is ‘Atomic
Slipper’ a New Beginning?”, Case Note, (1991-1992) 7 B.F.L.R. 437 [Macdonald, “A New 
Beginning?”] (provincial law in respect of property and civil rights should be displaced by federal law 
only “explicitly or by absolutely necessary implication” at 447 [emphasis in original]). See also 
Markevich v. Canada, 2001 FCA 144, [2001] 3 F.C. 449, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 225, aff’d 2003 SCC 9, 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 94, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 17 (while the ITA “may exclude application of general legal 
principles, rules and remedies,” this must be accomplished by “express language or necessary 
implication to that effect” at para. 25). 
176 Macdonald, “A New Beginning?”, ibid. at 450. 
177 Supra note 7 at para. 35. 
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to refer to private law in order to interpret its meaning. Likewise, it is not necessary to 
refer to private law rules, principles, and concepts to interpret the meaning of an 
acquisition of property if the concept has an autonomous tax meaning that is 
inherently dissociated from these sources. Although the first of these arguments can, 
where applicable, provide a persuasive reason for ignoring provincial rules, 
principles, and concepts that might otherwise influence the interpretation of federal 
legislation,178 it is not clear that it applies to the concept of an acquisition of property. 
On the contrary, as Justice Nöel observed in his dissenting opinion in Bérou, in the 
context of a provision referring to the acquisition of property, the ordinary meaning of 
the word “acquired” means “the acquisition of ownership of property.”179 The Oxford 
English Dictionary, for example, defines the word acquire as “[t]o gain, obtain, or get 
as one’s own, to gain the ownership of,”180 while Le Petit Robert defines the word 
acquire as “[b]ecome owner of (property, right) by purchase, exchange or 
succession,” and Le Dictionnaire du droit privé defines the word acquisition as “[a]ct 
by individual of becoming owner of thing or holder of right.”181 As a result, as Justice 
Nöel explains in his dissenting opinion in Bérou, “in the absence of some indication 
to the contrary, ownership of property cannot be acquired otherwise than in 
accordance with the applicable private law.”182 
 For this reason as well, the second argument—that the concept of an acquisition 
of property can be interpreted “on the basis of the tax legislation”—should also be 
rejected. On the contrary, as the Supreme Court of Canada has held on several 
occasions, where the ITA employs a word or expression with an established private or 
commercial law meaning, the word or expression should be construed in accordance 
with this private or commercial law meaning in the absence of “express direction” 
that another interpretation is warranted.183 In this circumstance, moreover, section 8.1 
of the federal Interpretation Act stipulates that “reference must be made to the rules, 
principles or concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is being 
applied.” Therefore, absent express direction to the contrary, the concept of an 
acquisition of property should be interpreted in accordance with the civil law in the 
Province of Quebec and the common law in the other provinces. 
 
178 For example, for tax purposes, Canadian courts have interpreted the concept of “residence” 
according to its ordinary meaning without reference to private law. See Thomson v. M.N.R., [1946] 
S.C.R. 209, 1 D.L.R. 689. For a brief discussion of this case in the context of Canadian bijuralism, see 
Duff, supra note 13 at 33-37. 
179 Supra note 7 at 221 [emphasis added]. 
180 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. “acquire” [emphasis added]. 
181 Cited in Bérou, supra note 7 at n. 34 [emphasis added, translated in Bérou]. 
182 Supra note 7 at 221. 
183 Will-Kare Paving & Contracting Ltd. v. Canada, 2000 SCC 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 915 at para. 30, 
188 D.L.R. (4th) 242, Major J. See also Continental Bank Leasing Corp. v. Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 
298, 163 D.L.R. (4th) 385. 
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2. Whether Otherwise Provided by Law 
 Turning to the second inquiry under section 8.1, the majority reasoning in Bérou 
suggests three arguments as to why a reference to the civil law of Quebec to interpret 
the concept of an acquisition of property might be “otherwise provided by law”: First, 
as Justice Létourneau declared, subsection 248(3) reflects a legislative intent “to 
harmonize” the civil law and the common law in order to provide “fair and equal 
treatment to all Canadian taxpayers,” as a consequence of which, courts must 
interpret the concept of an acquisition of property in accordance with this legislative 
intent.184 Second, as Justices Desjardins and Létourneau both argued, because the 
concept of an acquisition is the counterpart of a disposition, and because the effect of 
the statutory definition of a disposition is to incorporate into the ITA the common law 
rule that there is a disposition of property whenever there is a transfer of beneficial 
ownership even though legal ownership remains unchanged, it follows that there is an 
acquisition of property whenever a party to an agreement obtains beneficial 
ownership even though the other party retains legal ownership.185 Finally, as Justice 
Létourneau also argued, the judicial test in Wardean Drilling and the Canada 
Revenue Agency’s subsequent Interpretation Bulletin had endured for many years 
without legislative amendment, suggesting that they were consistent with the 
legislative intent expressed in subsection 248(3).186 As with the arguments against any 
need to refer to private law rules, principles, or concepts in order to interpret the 
meaning of an acquisition of property for tax purposes, none of these arguments is 
persuasive in light of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act and the goals of Canadian 
bijuralism. 
 Regarding what is now paragraph 248(3)(e), Justice Létourneau is correct to 
suggest that it reflects a legislative intent to harmonize various civil law and common 
law concepts for tax purposes. In order to accomplish this harmonization, however, 
the provision does not disregard the civil law altogether, but instead deems various 
civil law relationships to be trusts, beneficial interests, and beneficial ownership for 
the purposes of the application of the ITA in Quebec.187 Most importantly, paragraph 
248(3)(e) does not, for these purposes, deem property in relation to which a person 
has possession, use, and risk to be beneficially owned by that person, limiting this 
status to a situation where a person “has in relation to the property (i) the right of 
ownership, (ii) a right as a lessee under an emphyteusis, or (iii) a right as a 
beneficiary in a trust.”188 Thus, while the provision assimilates various civil law 
relationships to the common law concept of beneficial ownership, it does not import 
the common law concept of beneficial ownership into the application of the ITA in 
 
184 Supra note 7 at 186. 
185 Ibid. at 183, Desjardins J., 188, Létourneau J. 
186 Ibid. at 189. 
187 Supra note 1. This version, which differs from the version that was discussed in Bérou, applies to 
property the ownership of which was acquired after 1990. 
188 Ibid. 
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relation to the Province of Quebec. To conclude that legislative intent requires that the 
concept of beneficial ownership be harmonized in this manner therefore misconstrues 
the purpose and effect of subparagraph 248(3)(e)(i) and ignores the explicit 
legislative intent in section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act to respect both the common 
law and the civil law as “equally authoritative and recognized sources of the law of 
property and civil rights in Canada.” 
 The second argument—that the statutory definition of a disposition dictates that 
property is acquired for tax purposes when a taxpayer obtains beneficial ownership 
even though another person retains legal ownership—depends on two propositions: 
(1) that the concept of an acquisition is the counterpart of a disposition, and (2) that 
the effect of the statutory definition of a disposition is to incorporate into the ITA the 
common law rule that there is a disposition of property whenever there is a transfer of 
beneficial ownership even though legal ownership remains unchanged. While the first 
of these propositions reflects a plausible reading of the scheme of the ITA, it is not set 
out in any statutory provision, but rather depends entirely on judicial interpretation.189 
As such, it is not clear that such judicial interpretation should override the legislative 
intent expressed in section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act that courts should refer to the 
private law of the relevant province to complete federal legislation that employs 
undefined terms with established private law meanings. The second of these 
propositions is also doubtful, although apparently admitted by the parties in Bérou.190 
A provision that deems a disposition not to include a transfer of legal ownership 
without a change in beneficial ownership does not logically entail that a disposition 
includes a transfer of beneficial ownership without a transfer of legal ownership.191 
Subsequent amendments to the statutory definition of a disposition make this 
proposition even more doubtful by removing the reference to the common law 
concept of “legal ownership” that has no counterpart in the civil law.192 As a result, 
although it seems reasonable to conclude (as Justice Addy did in Olympia and York193) 
that the statutory definition of a disposition is dissociated from provincial private law 
by specifically including “any transaction or event entitling a taxpayer to proceeds of 
disposition of the property,”194 it does not clearly follow that a disposition includes a 
transaction in which there is a transfer of beneficial ownership without a transfer of 
legal ownership—particularly in Quebec, where these common law concepts have no 
meaning absent a deeming provision in the ITA. On the contrary, since paragraph 
248(3)(e) deems property in respect of which a person has “the right of ownership”195 
to be beneficially owned by the person, this provision suggests that a transfer of 
 
189 See e.g. Olympia and York, supra note 55. 
190 Supra note 8 at 183, Desjardins J.A., 223, Noël J.A. 
191 See Marie-Pierre Allard, “Conditional Obligations”, supra note 74 at 1796; Duff, supra note 13 
at 57-58. 
192 ITA, supra note 1, ss. 248(1), s.v. “disposition” (e)-(f). 
193 Supra note 54. 
194 See ITA, supra note 1, s. 248(1), s.v. “disposition” (a). 
195 [Emphasis added]. 
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possession, use, and risk in Quebec would not constitute a transfer of beneficial 
ownership under the ITA so long as the transferor retains “the right of ownership” in 
civil law. 
 The last of these arguments—that Parliament effectively endorsed Justice 
Cattanach’s twofold test in Wardean Drilling by allowing it and the Canada Revenue 
Agency’s subsequent Interpretation Bulletin to stand absent legislative reversal—is 
also unconvincing. Although Parliament’s inaction on the matter may signify 
legislative approval in one respect, it is important to note that it was not until the 
Federal Court of Appeal’s 1999 decision in Bérou that the twofold test in Wardean 
Drilling was conclusively applied within the Province of Quebec. More importantly, 
whatever legislative intent might be read into the absence of a statutory amendment is 
now subject to the express intent in section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act that 
“[b]oth the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized 
sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada” and that “reference must be 
made to the rules, principles or concepts in force in the province at the time the 
enactment is being applied” whenever it is necessary in order to interpret a federal 
enactment. For this reason, it is difficult to conclude that legislative failure to assign a 
specific meaning to the acquisition of property implies legislative endorsement of a 
harmonized concept based on the twofold test in Wardean Drilling. On the contrary, 
as argued earlier, the goals of Canadian bijuralism suggest that courts should 
dissociate the interpretation of federal legislation from provincial private law only 
where a legislative intention to this effect is explicitly indicated or necessarily implied 
by the words of the statutory text.196 
3. Conclusion 
 If it is both necessary to refer to “rules, principles or concepts forming part of the 
law of property and civil rights” in order to interpret the meaning of an acquisition of 
property and not “otherwise provided by law,” section 8.1 of the federal 
Interpretation Act provides that reference must be made to “the rules, principles or 
concepts in force in the province at the time [that the relevant provision] is being 
applied.” As explained in the second part of this paper, these rules, principles, and 
concepts are governed by the common law and provincial statutes like the Sale of 
Goods Act in the common law provinces, and by the C.C.Q. and other civilian 
authorities in the Province of Quebec. To the extent that the twofold test in Wardean 
Drilling reflects the common law distinction between legal and beneficial ownership, 
therefore, section 8.1 suggests that it should no longer apply within Quebec, thereby 
reversing the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Bérou. For the same reason, one 
might also question the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Kowdrysh, which ignored 
the rules, principles, and concepts governing the ownership and transfer of property 
in common law jurisdictions in order to conclude that the taxpayer had acquired 
 
196 Supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. 
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property for the purposes of a temporary investment tax credit when he entered into a 
binding and enforceable contract. Although this interpretation may have been 
justified on tax policy grounds,197 dictionary definitions of the words “acquire” and 
“acquisition”, and section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act, suggest that the 
concept of an acquisition of property should, absent an express direction or necessary 
implication to the contrary, be governed by the common law test in Wardean Drilling. 
IV. Codifying the Concept of an Acquisition of Property in the 
Income Tax Act  
 If section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act requires courts to interpret the 
concept of an acquisition of property in the ITA in accordance with the provincial 
private law to which the transaction is subject, differences between civil law and 
common law rules, principles, and concepts governing the ownership and transfer of 
property may produce different tax consequences depending on whether the 
transaction is subject to the civil law of Quebec or the common law of the other 
provinces. Where property is sold by means of a conditional sale or lease-option 
agreement, for example, the C.C.Q. suggests that the purchaser does not acquire the 
property until the condition is satisfied or the option is exercised because ownership 
remains with the vendor or lessor until that time,198 while the common law suggests 
that the purchaser acquires the property as soon as possession, use, and risk are 
transferred, since this results in a transfer of beneficial ownership.199 
 Although these different outcomes may be compatible with the goal of Canadian 
bijuralism to recognize the civil law and the common law as “equally authoritative ... 
sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada,” they contradict an 
important principle of Canadian income tax law—that the ITA should apply equally 
and uniformly throughout the country. Moreover, since the impact of section 8.1 on 
the interpretation of the ITA will ultimately depend on judicial decisions, the meaning 
of an acquisition of property for tax purposes may be subject to significant 
uncertainty for a considerable period of time—particularly in Quebec, where cases 
prior to the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Bérou took widely different views on 
the implications of lease-option agreements on the acquisition of property for tax 
purposes. For both of these reasons, it would be advisable to amend the ITA by 
enacting a statutory definition of an “acquisition of property” to ensure uniformity 
 
197 The court explained that to require taxpayers to acquire beneficial ownership of the property in 
order to deduct the temporary investment tax credit would provide an unintended windfall to 
taxpayers who purchased farming equipment “before the program was even conceived and put into 
effect” and were “fortunate enough to have the equipment delivered after 2 December 1992 up to 31 
December 1993,” while disqualifying taxpayers who the credit induced to purchase farming 
equipment after the program came into force but who did not receive the equipment until after 31 
December 1993 (Kowdrysh, supra note 45 at para. 8). 
198 See the discussion in Part II.B, above. 
199 See the discussion in Part II.A, above. 
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and certainty in the application of ITA provisions that rely on this concept to 
determine the tax consequences of different transactions. 
 In order to devise such a definition, at least three issues must be addressed: As a 
preliminary matter, one must decide whether a single definition should apply 
throughout the ITA or whether different definitions should apply to specific 
provisions in which the concept is employed. However this preliminary question is 
addressed, a second issue concerns the language and content of the statutory 
definition or definitions, which should presumably accord both with the scheme of 
the ITA and with the goal of Canadian bijuralism to recognize the equal status of the 
common law and the civil law as “sources of the law of property and civil rights in 
Canada.” A final issue concerns the potential implications of this definition or 
definitions for related provisions such as the statutory definition of a disposition in 
subsection 248(1) and the interpretive rule for civil law relationships in subsection 
248(3), or for other provisions such as the “available for use” rules for depreciable 
property,200 the specified leasing property rules in the Income Tax Regulations,201 the 
election for leasing properties,202 or the rules in sections 79 and 79.1 governing the 
acquisition or reacquisition of property by a creditor as a consequence of a debtor’s 
failure to pay a debt. 
 Beginning with the first of these issues, it is certainly reasonable to suggest that a 
single definition of an acquisition of property for the purposes of the ITA as a whole 
might be inappropriate. Since the concept of an acquisition of property appears in 
 
200 ITA, supra note 1, ss. 13(26)-(31). Under these rules, the capital cost of a property acquired by a 
taxpayer may not be added in computing the taxpayer’s undepreciated capital cost of property of the 
class until “the time the property is considered to have become available for use by the taxpayer.” 
201 C.R.C., c. 945, ss. 1100(1.1)-(1.3) [Regulations]. In general, these rules limit the amount that a 
taxpayer may deduct as capital cost allowance in respect of property that is used principally to earn 
rent or leasing revenue to an amount equal to the notional repayment of principal on a notional loan to 
the lessee of an amount equal to the purchase price of the property. As explained in the Supplementary 
Information accompanying the 1989 Federal Budget, the purpose of the rules is to reduce the tax 
advantages that would otherwise be available to tax-exempt or non-taxable taxpayers by leasing 
property with accelerated capital cost allowance rates from taxpaying lessors to whom they can 
effectively trade the capital cost allowance deductions in exchange for reduced rental payments. 
Although the economic effect of these rules from the lessor’s perspective is to treat a lease as a loan, 
the rules depend on the prior characterization of the transaction as a lease and do not actually 
recharacterize lease transactions as loans.  
202 Ibid., s. 16.1. This provision complements the specified leasing property rules in ss. 1100(1.1)-
(1.3) of the Regulations. It allows lessees to deduct capital cost allowance and notional interest in 
respect of leased property where they file a joint election with the lessor of the property. Unlike the 
specified leasing property rules, this provision deems the lease not to be a lease, the lessee to have 
acquired the property at a cost equal to its fair market value, the lessee to have borrowed an amount 
from the lessor equal to this fair market value for the purpose of acquiring the property, interest to 
accrue on this loan at a prescribed amount, and lease payments paid by the lessee to be blended 
payments of interest and principal on account of the loan. Like the specified leasing property rules, 
however, this provision also depends on the initial characterization of the transaction as a lease. 
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numerous ITA provisions with different tax implications, one might reasonably expect 
that the purpose of each provision in which the concept is used would be better 
served by a specific definition applicable to the provision itself rather than a general 
definition that applies for the purposes of the ITA as a whole. In Kowdrysh, for 
example, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the taxpayer had acquired property 
when it entered into a binding and enforceable contract, on the basis that this meaning 
of an acquisition of property was more suitable to the temporary investment tax credit 
at issue in the case than the judicial test in Wardean Drilling.203 For the purposes of 
the capital cost allowance regime, on the other hand, a meaning akin to the second 
branch of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling might be more appropriate.204 
 Notwithstanding this argument for multiple statutory definitions of an acquisition 
of property, there are three reasons why a single definition for the ITA as a whole 
should be preferred: First, since the words “property acquired” appear in a consistent 
form in the various provisions in which the concept is used, established principles of 
statutory interpretation suggest that it should be given the same meaning on the basis 
that Parliament is presumed to have intended this result.205 Second, to the extent that 
the concept of an acquisition is properly regarded as the counterpart to a disposition, 
the existence of a statute-wide definition of the latter in subsection 248(1) suggests 
that a statutory definition of an acquisition of property should also apply for the 
purposes of the ITA as a whole. Finally, as a practical matter, the urgency of enacting 
a statutory definition to prevent inequality and uncertainty in the application of the 
ITA favours the rapid enactment of a general definition, to which modifications could 
subsequently be made as necessary for the purpose of specific provisions. 
 Turning to the language and content of the definition, two considerations seem 
paramount. First, in order to prevent significant disruption to existing transactions and 
commercial practices, a statutory definition of an acquisition of property should 
conform as closely as possible to established judicial interpretations of the concept. 
Second, in order to recognize the equal status of the common law and the civil law as 
“sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada,” the definition should be 
drafted in a manner that does not subsume one legal system to the other or disregard 
one of the two legal systems altogether by employing the rules, principles, or 
concepts of one legal system exclusively. While the first of these considerations 
 
203 Supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text. See the discussion in Part III.B.3, above. 
204 To the extent that the subsequent disposition of depreciable property results in recaptured 
depreciation or a terminal loss, it seems reasonable to conclude that these tax consequences should fall 
upon the taxpayer who has the possession and use of the property and bears the risk of its loss. An 
emphasis on possession, use and risk is also consistent with the available for use rules in ss. 13(26)-
(31) of the ITA (supra note 1), which in many cases defer the time when a taxpayer may add the 
capital cost of the property to the taxpayer’s undepreciatiated capital cost of property of the class until 
the property is delivered to the taxpayer. 
205 See Elmer A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 93-94; 
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 4th ed. (Markham, Ont.: 
Butterworths, 2002) at 162-68. 
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might favour a definition based on of the twofold test in Wardean Drilling, the second 
rejects this definition to the extent that it reflects the common law distinction between 
legal and beneficial ownership. Nonetheless, since the C.C.Q. employs the concepts 
of possession, use, and risk,206 it would be possible to draft a statutory definition that 
could encompass both legal systems by stipulating that property is acquired for tax 
purposes either when a taxpayer acquires ownership of the property or where the 
taxpayer obtains possession and use of the property, and assumes all the risks of loss 
of the property. 
 In common law provinces, a definition along these lines would have the same 
effects as the twofold test in Wardean Drilling, and would presumably apply to 
purchasers under conditional sales agreements and lessees under security or financing 
leases. In Quebec, a definition along these lines would capture ordinary sales 
agreements, instalment sales, conditional sales with either a suspensive or a 
resolutory condition, as well as contracts of leasing, thereby achieving similar results 
as the twofold test in Wardean Drilling without relying on the common law concepts 
on which this test is based. 
 With respect to the implications of such a definition for other statutory 
provisions, this paper cannot offer definitive conclusions, since it has not examined 
these provisions in detail. To the extent that the concept of an acquisition is 
understood as the counterpart of a disposition, however, it seems reasonable to expect 
that the statutory definition of a disposition should mirror the definition of an 
acquisition. Indeed, since the current definition of a disposition refers to the concept 
of beneficial ownership, an amendment that would replace this language with a 
reference to possession, use, and risk would also advance the goal of Canadian 
bijuralism to recognize the equal status of the civil law and the common law. For the 
same reason, reconsideration should also be given to subsection 248(3), which 
subsumes the civil law of Quebec to the common law of the other provinces by 
deeming various civil law relationships to be trusts, beneficial interests, and 
beneficial ownership for the purposes of the application of the ITA in relation to the 
Province of Quebec. As well, since sections 79 and 79.1 also rely on the concept of 
beneficial ownership, they too should be reconsidered in light of any statutory 
definition of an acquisition of property. In contrast to these provisions, however, it 
does not appear as though any consequential amendment would be required to the 
“available for use” rules in subsections 13(26) to (31), the specified leasing property 
rules in subsections 1100(1.1) to (1.3) of the Regulations, or the election in section 
16.1, since these provisions do not use common law concepts and do not affect the 
meaning of an acquisition of property, but instead determine specific tax 
consequences for property that is already acquired within the meaning of the ITA. 
 
206 Supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.  
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Conclusion
 Since the concept of an acquisition of property plays an important role in the ITA, 
it is somewhat curious that it remains undefined. Although courts have generally 
interpreted this concept in accordance with the twofold test in Wardean Drilling, this 
test is premised on common law concepts and is incompatible with the goals of 
Canadian bijuralism expressed in the Federal Law—Civil Law Harmonization Act, 
No. 1 and section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act. As argued in the third part of 
this paper, since it is both necessary to refer to “rules, principles or concepts forming 
part of the law of property and civil rights” in order to interpret the meaning of an 
acquisition of property and it is not “otherwise provided by law,” section 8.1 of the 
Interpretation Act requires that the meaning of an acquisition of property be 
interpreted in accordance with the civil law in the Province of Quebec and the 
common law in the other provinces. For this reason, the continuing validity of the 
Federal Court of Appeal decisions in Bérou and Kowdrysh is uncertain. As a result, 
moreover, transactions may be subject to different tax consequences depending on 
whether they are subject to the civil law of Quebec or the common law of the other 
provinces. While this result may be compatible with the goals of Canadian bijuralism, 
it contradicts a fundamental principle of Canadian income tax law—that the ITA 
should apply equally and uniformly throughout the country. 
 In order to promote uniformity and certainty in the application of ITA provisions 
that rely on the concept of an acquisition of property, this paper recommends that the 
ITA be amended by introducing a statutory definition of the concept. More 
specifically, it suggests, this definition should apply for the purposes of the ITA as a 
whole and should encompass both legal systems by stipulating that property is 
acquired for tax purposes either when a taxpayer acquires ownership of the property 
or where the taxpayer obtains possession and use of the property, and assumes all the 
risk of loss of the property. Finally, the introduction of a statutory definition along 
these lines should be accompanied by consequential amendments to the statutory 
definition of a disposition of property in subsection 248(1), to the interpretive rules 
for civil law relationships in subsection 248(3), and to the rules in sections 79 and 
79.1 governing the acquisition or reacquisition of property by a creditor as a 
consequence of a debtor’s failure to pay a debt. 
    
 
